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The second Volume of Sheffield University's 'Road To Civil War' bound primary source information was completed March 2013 and I began this new page from that date. Please search my website for the first page if you missed it and check this page out on a regular basis for updates. All text is copied as near to the original as possible so the words and sentence structure might seem a little confusing but, should there be any typos of my own, I apologize and invite corrections from readers.

CIVIL WAR TRACTS

2. POLITICAL

(iii) Political Tracts.

1. A Medicine for the Times

2. The case of Ship Money Briefly Discoursed.

3. A Discourse shewing in what state the Three Kingdomes are in at this present.

4. Certain Queries of Some Tender Conscienced Christians.

5. A letter sent from a Private Gentleman.

6. An Answer or Necessary Animadversions.

7. The Lord George Digbie's Apologie.

8. The Maximes of Mixt Monarchy.

9. A Plea for the Parliament.

10. The Parliament's Endevours for setling of peace.

11. XI Queries Propounded and Answered.

12. Considerations upon the present state of the Affairs of this Kingdom.

13. Reasons why this Kingdom ought to adhere to the parliament.

14. England's Absolute Monarchy.

15. Vox Populi.

16. The Second Part of Vox Populi

17. A Royall Position.

18. What kinde of Parliament Will please the King.

19. The Moderator expecting Sudden Peace or Certaine Ruine.

20. A Suddaine Answer to a Suddaine Moderatour.

21. A letter from a Worthy Gentleman.

A MEDICINE FOR THE TIMES. OR, AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST FACTION.

written, By T.J.

Containing these Cures, viz.

1. How to cure a man that hath a factious Spirit.
2. How to cure a woman so possessed.
3. A new and direct experiment, to know the Kings-Evil.
4. How to cure one that is troubled with crosses.
5. A cure for him that is troubled with an Ovall-pate. (in English) a

Round-head.
6. A brief Definition of a Disease call'd Obstinancie.
7. A cure for his Impatience, that is angry with me for this slender

expression of my Art.

LONDON. Printed for Rober Wood. 1641.

A MEDICINE FOR THE TIMES.

1. How to cure a man that is possessed with a factious spirit.

Take one heartfull of Ecclesiastical obedience, as much of Regall submission (for this being a malady of the minde, requires the Phisick to be mentall) forbear the societie of those infected people, that would make a breach in that sacred Text; Fear God, Honour the King. Let not the ground of your Religion (which is the prop of the soul) consist only in Contradiction, unlesse you hope to gain salvation, by disputing niceties. Or if you are so strangely possessed, that you must make your lives a tedious Argument, let not your reasons be like the womens reasons, (it is not, because it is not ) there is as much diference betwixt Religion and Faction, as is between a Temple of Saints and Den of Theeves. If you do not love your enemies, according to divine injunction (though that part of the Litanie be dispute) you may question your own Salvation. If you can thus purge yourself with these Receipts, you may quietly enjoy your health, without the unnecessary charge of bleeding.

2. How to cure a woman so possessed.

A Woman being the weaker Vessell, shall have the application of a weaker Remedy; let her obey her husband when he hath taken his Cure, and not disdain to conceive that (over his own Family) he is both a King and Bishop, one that is capable both of morall Government, and Divine: this observation in her, will keepe her from pulling off the sacred chain that is about the neck of Authoritie, and free her from a strange madnesse she hath got in expounding Scripture and to conclude (according to her own Beliefe) I would not have her sit or lye Crosse-leg'd, it is abominable, and the continuance of such crossing may prevent the first great Blessing. Encrease and multiply.

3. A new and direct Experiment to know the Kings Evill.

The small Practice I have had in Physick, hath instructed me that one simple hath been mix'd with many Vareties; for severall Diseases; such use must I make of this one excellent drug obedience; which being mix'd with right consideration, will so purge the brain, that the eyes of good opinion will bee open, and your discerning shall be perfect; whereas before, you look'd as people do through deceitfull glasses: every white seem'd a blemish, and every such blemish a thousand; I must now prescribe a Diet: fast one month from Faction, observe the Kings Lawes, behold him in his true-Prerogative; were not about the new stamps Coyn of your Conscience, Ego & Rexment, I and my  King. Do not onely ceremonially take the Oath of supremacie, but obey it with a true consideration, that the breach of it will shake the very frame of your Religion; if you can sincerely obey all this, you have a sound body, and cannot be troubled with the Kings Evill,


IV.

How to cure one that is troubled with Crosses.

Carry no Coyn about you; for you know that there is an image on one side, and a Crosse on the other: and I would have you so much the more avoid it, because you are already prone to worship it, and some think it is the only way to make a Papist on you: avoid that Idolatrous play of push-pin (though with a sister) let not your Children be instructed in the horn-book' because of the first Character: forbear to walk in these forbidden paths, till their names be chang'd (via.) Whitecrosse-street, Redcrosse-street, Charin-Crosse, Cow-Crosse, Ratcliffe-Crosse, Bishopsgate-street, Ave-mari lane.

If any mans Name be Crosse, let him change it, and call himself Overthwart, as William Overthwart, John Overthwart, or Martin Overthwart; unlesse his name be Andrew, then you may call him Andrew Crosse: I will not wish you to put away all Crosse wives, because I would not debar ye of the generall society of women.

I should applaud their pulling downe of Cheap-side Crosse, but I fear that there are certain men amongst them, who (under pretence of zeal) weigh not altogether so much the Idolatry of the form, as the ponderous substance of the Lead: and I pray let any honest man judge, what relation Fellony hath to Acts of Piety, if it have, we must censure this to be a holy Robbery-: which according to commonsence, is a strange contradiction, and cannot hold in Religion: unlesse they largely stretch this Text to it: They tooke Heaven by violence: which they conceive (according to litterall explanation) is with Clubs and staves, and short Swords, worn up to their Arme pits. Some shut up their shops, to make the times hard purposing to starve his Majesties Subjects, into a zeal like theirs; (in conclusion) I would not have all Crosses put down; because I would have no alteration in the Regall Diadem, which hath stood many wise Ages unquestion'd. I am an honest Physitian (though I say't) and am so farre from being a papist, that I dare curse the Pope; so farre from being a separatist I dare love the King: And that I am no Neuter, shall appear in my willing service (provided there be an equality in my Spirit and my Office in the hazard of my life for my King and Country.


5. A Cure for Him that is troubled with an Ovall-pate, (in English) a Round-head.

No man is demonstrated to be a Round-head, but he that takes the name to himself; and conceives he is so, because he is in opposition to the Cavalier: (who may be an honest man, though he wear skarlet and silver lace, and holds it no sin to be in fashion.) A Round-head is a man (though cut within a quarter of an inch to the skull) hath more hair then wit, and according to his daily distractions, may be titled Hair-brained: And this proves him to be an Hypocrite: for though his hair be clipt short, he loves to wear it long, and very long; which is, from Generation to Generation. (Long may he wear it.) Hath not that man more hair then wit, whose wit is so much troubled with his hair? (your censure Gentlemen:) For my own part, cause I would know the way to heaven to an hairs breadth, I have left off my periwig; and I have not had one pious thought, for that cause, more then I had before, It is in hair, as it is in habit; one man wonders why I wear it long. I as much wonder why he wears it short: I love a broad brim'd hat, he loves a narrow one; my opinion of this formall reformation, is but a change from one indifferent ceremonie to another. In brief, if a man be troubled with a Round-head let him do as if his right hand offended him. Desparate Diseases must have desperate cures.


6. The Brief definition of a Disease'd Obstinacie.

If a man worship zealously his own opinion, contrary to divine Inspiration; which he cannot assure himself, whilst he hath one thought of Oppression; or wants the zealous obedience he ought to pay to Gods Lord Deputie; his own Anointed: for in this point my opinion runs hand in hand with the Gentleman that writ these Lines:

"They whom their King affron', the like would do,
To th' King of Kings, could they come at him to."

I am so farre from the spirit of Contradiction, that if I had a full assurance, the alteration of my form would save me, I should willingly resigne my fashionable habit, and confine my self to the steeple crown hat, short hair, Geneva Ruffe, with all accoutrements correspondent to this posture; but indeed I will not beleeve any man can adde to his salvation or damnation by Formeerly: if preaching is as sacred in a stable as in a Church, why not in a Church as well as a stable (a place fit for Oxen and Asses) if ye do it in remembrance that it was the necessitated place of our Saviour, ye stand in your own light, and confute your selves; you may with as little idolatrie keep in view the form of that whereon he died, as of that where he was born; he that conceives Cheapside Crosse may cause idolatrie, hath but a weak faith, and, for ought I know, he doubts if it stand long, himself may be won to be a worshipper, and by this means would prevent it: For my part, if he lik't as I do, which is for the workmanship in the nice and naturall postures, and as the grace of so glorious a city, he would go home, mend shoes, and never trouble his head about it. I plead not for it, for were it down, I would not give the poor contribution of a penny to have another erected, because it should not trouble the heads of the unimploy'd people.



7. A Cure for his Impudence that is angry with me, for the expression of my Art.

In the first place, he hath no cause to doubt my Medicines, for ile give him no worse then ile take my self, Let him not brand me with a prejudicate opinion, that I am a Papist; for, by yea and nay, I am none, but can with a safe conscience, take the oath of Supremacie; I love the King and all those that love him, I daily pray for the prosperitie of all those high designes in parliament; I am no Railer and Pamphletizer against Bishops; 'tis a charitie I hold not, to laugh at any mans fall, though my enemie and persecuter: Nor would I weaken so great a synod as this present Parliament, as to conceive they know not how to dispose of Offenders; if things may not proceed in Order, a Common-wealth will quickly prove a heap of Ruines; and resolve, as the world must (at the generall doom) to its first Chaos. And thus being come to the worlds end, I leave you.

FINIS.


GREAT Fires happening in Townes or Cities, are sometimes the cause that other contiguous houses are spoyld and demolisht, besides those which the flame it selfe ceazes: So now, in the case of shipmony, not onely the judgement it selfe which hath beene given against the subject, doth make a great gap and breach in the rights and Franchises of England, but the arguments and pleadings also, which conduced to that judgement, have extended the mischiefe further, and scarce left any thing uviolated. Such strange contradiction there hath beene amongst the pleaders, and dissent amongst the Judges, even in those Lawes which are most fundamentall, that we are left in a more confused uncertainty of our highest priviledges, and those customes which are most essentiall to Freedome then we were before. To introduce the legality of Ship-scot, such a Prerogative hath been maintained, as destroyes all other Law, and is incompatible with popular liberty: and such art hath beene used to deny, traverse, avoid, or frustrate the true force or meaning of all our Lawes and Charters, that if wee grant Ship-money upon these grounds, with Ship-money we grant all besides. To remove therefore this uncertainty, which is the mother of all injustice, confusion, and publike dissention, it is most requisite that this grand Councell and Treshault Court (of which none ought to thinke dishonourably) would take these Ardua Regni, these weighty and dangerous difficulties, into serious debate, and solemnly end that strife, which no other place of judicature can so effectually extinguish.

That the King ought to have aid of his subjects in time of danger, and common aid in case of common danger, is laid down for a ground, and agreed upon by all sides, But about this aid there remaines much variety and contrariety of opinion amongst the greatest Sages of our Law; and the principall points therein controverted and these foure First, by what Law the King may compell aid. Secondly, when it is to be levied. Thirdly, how it is to be levied. Fourthly, what kind of aid it must be.

1. Some of the Judges argue from the Law of Nature, that since the king is head, and bound to protect, therefore he must have wherewithall to protect: but this proves only that which no man denies. The next Law insisted upon is Prerogative; but it is not punctually explained what Prerogative, whether the Prerogative naturall of all Kings, or the Prerogative legall of the Kings of England. Some of the Judges urge that by Law there is naturall allegeance due to the King from the subject; and it doth not stand with that allygeance that the Princes cannot compell aid, but must require the common consent therein. Other presse, that the Law hath setled a property of goods in the subject, and it doth not stand with that property, that the King may demand them without consent. Some take it for granted, that by Royall Prerogative, as it is part of the Lawes of England, the king may charge the Nation without publike consent, and therefore it being part of the Law; it is no invasion upon Law. Others take it for granted, that to levie money without consent is unjust, and that the Kings prerogative cannot extend to any unjust thing: So many contrary points of warre doe our Trumpets sound at once, and in such confusion doe our Judges leave us, whilest either side takes that for granted, which by the other is utterly denied. By these grounds Royall prerogative, and popular liberty may seeme things irroconciliable; though indeed they are not; neither doth either side in words affirme so much, though their proofes bee so contradictory. King Charles his maxime is, that the peoples liberty strenghtens the Kings prerogaive, and the Kings prerogative is to maintain the peoples liberty; and by this it seemes that both are compatible, and that prerogative is the more subordinate of the two. The Kings words also since have beene upon another occcasion, That he ever intended his people should enjoy property of goods, and liberty of persons, holdng nothing so great, as he that was King of a rich and free people: and if they had not property of goods, and liberty of persons, they could bee neither rich nor free. Here we see, that the liberty of the subjects is a thing which makes a King great; and that the Kings prerogative hath only for its ends to maintaine the peoples liberty. Wherefore it is manifest, that in nature there is more favour due to the liberty of the subject, then to the Prerogative of the King, since the one is ordained onely for the preservation of the other; and then to salve these knots, our dispute must be, what prerogative the peoples good and profit will beare, not what liberty the kings absolutenesse or prorogative may admit and in this dispute it is more just that we appeale to written Lawes, then to the breasts of Kings themselves. For we know Nationall Lawes are made by consent of Prince and people both, and so cannot bee conceived to be prejudiciall to either side; but where the meere will of the Prince is Law, or where some few Ministers of his may alleage what they will for Law in his behalfe, no mediocrity or justice is to be expected: we all know that no slave or villaine can be subjected to more miserable bondage than to be left meerly to his Lords absolute discretion and we all see that the thraldome of such is most grievous, which have no bounds set to their Lords discretion. Let us then see what Fortescue writes, not regard what Court-dependants doe interpret, and his words are, fol.84.cap.36. Rec Anglia nee per se, nec per suos Ministros Tollogia subsidia, out quavis onera alia imponst legis fuis, out leges scrum murat, out nova condie sine concessionevel asseasu tosisu regni sui in Parliamento suo expresso. These words are full and generall, and plain, and indirect affirmance of the ancient Law and usage of England and it is not sufficent for the Kings Counsell to say, that these words extend not to ship-money: for if there were any doubt, the interpretation ought rather to favour liberty than Prerogative.

It is not sufficent for Judge Jones to say, that it is proprioum quarto mode to a King, and an inseparable naturall Prerogative of the Crowne to raise monies without assent, unlesse he first prove that such Prerogative be good and profitable for the people, and such as the people cannot subsist at all without it: nay, such as no Nation can subsist without it. This word Prerogative hath divers acceptions: sometimes it is taken for the latitude of Honour, sometimes for the latitude of Power. So we say the Prerogative of an Emperour is greater than that of a King; and that of a King greater than that of a Duke, or petty Potentate: and yet if Kings we say that the King of Denmark hath not so great a Prerogative as the King of England, nor the King of England as the King of France, &c. For here though their honour and title be the same, yet their power is not. Sometimes Prerogative signifies as much as Soveraignty; and in this generall consideration wee say, that all supreame Commanders are equall: and that they all have this essentiall inseparable Prerogative, that their power ought to be ample enough for their perfection, and good of the people, and no ampler: because the supreame of all humane Lawes is salus populi. To this Law all Lawes almost stoope; God dispences with many of his Lawes, rather than salus populi shall bee endangered; and that iron-law, which we call necessity itselfe, is but subservient to his Law: for rather then a nation shall perish, anything shall be held necessary, and legall by necssity: But to come to the Prerogative of England, and to speeke of it in generall, and competatively; we say it is a harmonious composure of policie, scarce to be paralleld in all the world, it is neither so boundlesse as to opresse the people in unjust things, nor so strait as to disable the King in just things: by the true fundamental constitutions of England, the beame hangs even between the King and the Subject: the Kings power doth not tread under foot the proples liberty, nor the peoples liberty the Kings power. All other Countires almost in Christendome, differ from us in this module of policie: some, but very few, allow a greater spheare of Soveraignty to their Princes; but for the most part now adayes the world is given to republistes, or to conditionate and restrained forms of government: howsoever we ought not to condemne any Nation as unjust herein, though differing from us; for though they seem perhaps very unpolitick; yet it is hard to be affirmed that God and Nature ever ordained the same method of rule, or scope of loyalty to all States whatsoever: besides, what dislike soever we take at other regiments, yet except it be in very great excesses or defects, we must not thinke change alwayes necessity, since custome in those great and generall points obtains the force of another nature, & nature is not to be changed. Divines of later have beene much to blame here in preaching one universall forme of government, as necessary to all Nations, and that not the moderate & equall neither, but such as ascribes all to Soveraignty, nothing at all to popular liberty: Some Lawyers also and Statesmen have deserved as ill of late, partly by suggesting that our English Laws are too injurious to our King; and partly by informing, that this King is more limited by Law then his Progenitors were, and that till he be as the King of France is, Rex Asinorum, he is but a subject to his subjects, and as a Minor under the command of guardians: but what hath ensued out of the Kings jealously of his subjects, and overstraining his Prerogative? nothing but irrepairable losse, and mischiefe both to King and Commonwealth: and indeed the often and great infections and insurrections which have happened of late, almost all over Europe, may suffice to warn all wise Princes; not to over-straine their Prerogatives too high; not to give ease to such Counsellors as some of our Judges are, who affirme our Kings prerogative to be in all points unalterable, and by consequence not depending upon Law at all: by another exception of this word Prerogative in England, we mean such Law here establisht, as gives the King such and such preheminences and priviledges before any subject; such as are not assentiall to royalty, but may bee annulled by the same power by which they were created. That the King shall defend and maintaine his subjects, is a duty belonging to the Office, not a priviledge belonging to the Crowne of a King; this obligation nature layes upon him, and no other power can dissolve it. Also that subjects shall afford aid, and joyne with their Princes in common defence, is a duty arising from the allegeance of the people, and not an honor rebounding only to the Prince; natures law hath made this a tie, not to be changed or infringed: for that which is annexed by an eternall superiour power cannot be made severable by a temporall humane power: but that such an Empourer, King or Potentate, shall have such aid, and compell it by such or such meanes, at such or such times, as to the praticular modes and circumstances of his aid, particular municipall Lawes must direct, and these it would bee as dangerous to alter, as it is absurd to hold unalterable. In a Parliament held by King James, it was debated, whether or no Tenures in Capite, and allowance of Purveyors might bee repealed and divided from the Crowne, and it was held that by no Act or statute they could bee taken away, because they were naturally inherent to the Crowne.

This resolution seemes very strange to me, since the Law of Tenures and Purveyors is not so naturall and essentiall to Monarchy, that it cannot; or may not subsist without it. For if in other Countries it be held a meere politicall way, perhaps an inconvenient thing, then why may not the Princes Royalty, and the peoples safety be preserved intire without it in England: And if so, then why shall not the same authority have vigor to repeale it; which wanted not vigor to inform it. I cannot conceive that the Parliament herein reflected upon what was formall in Law to be done, but rather upon what was convenient: such insignia suprema, Majestatis as these; I did not hold it fit to be dismembred from the Crowne in policy, I onely hold it a thing possible in law, nay though the King enjoyes diverse such like prerogatives more, as J. Jones thinkes, then any Prince in Christendome, yet should not I desire or advise to plucke away one the least Flower out of the Regall Garland, nor would it be (perhaps) Profitable for the State, to suffer the least diminution thereof. Wee know also, that in England the Prerogative hath beene bound in many cases, by Statute law, and restrained of diverse such priviledges, as were not essentiall, but meerely politicall. Nullum sempus occurrie Regi: this was one of the English Royalties, and very beneficiall many wayes, yet wee know this is in diverse cases limited by Act of parliament, and that very justly, as I. Hutton argues, The great and ancient Tax of Dangelt, it was a Subsidue taken by the kings of England, for the common defence of the Kingdome, yet this was first released by King Stephen, and after abolished for ever by the statutes of Edward the first: and there is no reason why an Act of parliament should not bee as valid in our case as it was in that. Wherefore it is to be admired; that J. Jones should account this way of aid by ship-money, or any other, without publicke consent, to bee Proprium quarto modo to the Kings of England, and since irrepealable, since our Kings have in all ages done such noble acts without it; and not onely defended, but also enlarged their Dominions. The last kinde of acception of this word Prerogative is improper. Thus to pardon malefactors, to dispence with penall Lawes, to grant Non obstantes, to be free from attainders, to call or discontinue, to prorogue or dissolve Parliaments, &c. are not truly and properly called Prerogatives: these all in some sense may be called Munities, or indemnities belonging to the sacred person of the King, as he is inviolable, and subject to no force & compulsion of any other, And as he is the foule of Law, in whose power alone it is to execute Law, and yet not to be constrained threto. To grant a pardon for some malefactors for some crimes, may perhaps be as heynous as to commit them; and that which drawes a guilt upon the King, cannot be said to be his priviledge. If it might be tearmed a Royalty, that the King is not questionable, or punishable, or to be forced to such acts as tend to the obstruction of justice, it might as well be so tearmed in acts tending to the transgression of Law: for in both he is alike free from any coercive or vindicative force. For it is out of necessity, not honour or benefit, that the King hath a freedome from constraint, or restraint in these cases; and that this freedome is inseparable, because no force can be used but by superiours or equals, and he which hath either superiours or equall, is no King. If a King should shut up the Courts of ordinary Justice, & prohibit all pleadings and proceedings betweene man and man, and refuse to authorize Judges for the determining of suits, hee would bee held to doe a most unkingly thing: and yet this may be as truly called a Prerogative, as to difuse and dissolve Parliaments. But it may be objected, that the King, besides such negative priviledge and freedome from force, hath also a positive and siezing subjects lands, &c. in divers cases, as in making Bulwarks upon any mans land for common defence, &c. To this it may be answered, That to such power the King is not intituled by his Prerogative, nor is it any benefit to him, necessity herein is his only warrant: for either this private inconvenience must happen, or a publike ruine follow; and in nature the lesse and private evill is to be chosen: and here the party trespassed enjoyes safety by it, and shall after receive satisfaction for his detriment. Were there such apparent unavoidable necessity in the Ship-scop, that either that course must be taken, or the community inevitably perish, or where the King wholly disinteressed in point of profit, or were there hope of restitution, it could not be without consent, and so not against Law. So then, for ought that is yet alleaged, Prerogative, except that which is essentiall to all Kings, without which they cannot bee kings, is alterable, and it ought to be deduced out of the written and knowne Lawes of the kingdome, and Law is not to be inferred out of that; we ought not to presume a Prerogative, & thence conclude it a Law, but we ought not to cite the Law, and thence prove it to be Prerogative. To descend then to our owne Lawes, yet there our Judges vary too. What the Common Law was in this point is doubted by some; and some say if the Common Law did allow the king such a Prerogative, to lay generall charge without consent, then statutes cannot alter it.

Some doe not accept against the force of Statute Law, but avoid our particular Statutes by divers severall evasive answers. Some say our Great Charter was but a grant of the King, extorted by force; some except against the 25. of Ed.1. because there is salvo in it: some against the 34. of Ed.1. as made in the Kings absence; some object against the 14. of Ed.3. as if it were temporary, and because it is not particularly recited in the Petition of Right: and the common evasion of all beneficiall Statutes, & of the Petition of right, is, that they binde the King from imposing pecuniary charges for the replenishing of his owne coffers, but not from imposing such personall services, as this Ship-scot is, in time of danger and necessity. J.  Crawly maintaines this Ship-scot to be good by Prerogative at the Common Law, and not to be altered by statute. What the Common Law was this Court can best determine; but it is obvious to all men, that no Prerogative can be at the Common Law, but it had some beginning, and that must be from either King or Subject, or both: and in this, it is not superiour to our Statute Law, and by consequence not unalterable. The Medes and persians had a Law, that no Law once past, should ever be repealed; but doubtlesse this Law being repealed first, all others might after suffer the same alteration, and it is most absurd to think that this Law might not be repealed by the same authority by which it was at first enacted. J. Jones sayes, our Statutes restraine tollages in generall termes, and cites divers cases, that a speciall interest shall not passe from the King, but in speciall terms; but his cases are put of private grantees, over whom the King ought to retaine a great preheminence: but the Law is, that where the whole state in grantee, that grant shall have the force of a Statute, because it is pro bono publico, and because the whole State is in value and dignity as much to be preferred before the King, as the king is before any private grantee. But J. Jones sayes further, if generall words shall extend to these extraordinary publike levies, then they may as well extend to his ordinary private rights & intradoes, & so cut off Aide pur faire filz Chivalier, &c. The contrary hereof is manifest, for the intent of all our Statutes is to defend the subject against such publike tollages and impositions, as every man is equally liable to, and as are not due in Law otherwise, or recoverable by ordinary action. Now these aids, &c. and the Kings ordinary revenues and services, are not such as are due from every man, but recoverable by ordinary action. Howsoever in all these doubts the Law would now be made cleare, and not onely the vertue of Statutes in generall, but also the true meaning of our particular Charters would be vindicated from these exceptions.

2. I come now to our second difficulty, when a publike charge may be laid. Here the favourers of Ship-money yet agree, that the King may not charge the subject meerly to fill his owne coffers; or annually, or when he will invade a forraigne enemy, or when Pirates rob, or burn Townes and Burroughs, for these ordinary defence is sufficient: and when there is imminent and eminent danger of publike invasion, we agree that the subject may be charged.

The qu&re then is, whether the King bee sole Judge of the danger, and of the remedy, or rather whether he be so sole Judge, that his meere affirmation and notification of a danger foreseene by him at a distance, or pretended onely to be foreseene, shall be so unquestionable, that he may charge the Kingdome thereupon at his discretion, though they assent not, nor apprehend the danger as it is forewarned. J. Crooke proves the contrary thus: If danger, sayes he, be far distant, if it be in report only of French Armadoes, and Spanish preparations, &c. though it be certaine, and not pretensive, yet Parliamentary aid may be speedy enough: and if it be imminent, then this way of Ship-scot will not be speedy enough; for either the designe is really to have new Ships built, and that will require longer time than a Parliament; or else money onely is aimed at, whereby to arme other Ships, and for this the Law hath provided a more expedite way than by Ship-scot, in case of imminent danger.

If then the King have power to presse all mens persons and Ships, and all are bound exponere fe, & sua, and to serve propriis sumisbus, when imminent danger is, and this defence hath alwayes beene held effectuall enough, it is consequent, that if he be not destitute of competent aid in present distresses, he cannot pretend a greater necessity in dangers more remote, when they are but suspected, or perhaps pretended onely.

My Lord Bramston sayes here, that there is a necessity of preventing a necessity: and that the Sea is part of the Kingdome, and therefore of necessity to be guarded as the Kingdome. The answer is, That the safety of the Kingdome does not necessarily depend upon the Ship-Scot, and so this necessity being removed, the necessity grounded upon this, fals off of it selfe. For if the Kingdome may escape ruine at hand when it is a storme, without Ship-money, it may much more escape it afar off being but a cloud. But grant the Sea to be a part of the Kingdome to some purposes, yet how is it a part essentiall, or equally valuable; or how does it appeare that the fate of the Land depends wholly upon the dominion of the Sea? France subsists now without the regiment of the Sea, and why may not we all well want the same? If England quite spend it selfe, and poure out all its treasure to preserve the Seigniory of the Seas, it is not certaine to exceed the Navall force of France, Spaine, Holland, &c. And if it content it selfe with its ancient strength of shipping, it may remaine as safe as it hath formerly done. Nay, I cannot see that either necessity of ruine, or necessity of dishonour can be truly pretended out of this, that France, Spaine, Holland, &c. are too potent at Sea for us.

The dominion of the Seas may be considered as a meer right, or as an honour, or as a profit to us. As a right, it is a theame fitter for schollers to whet their wits upon, then for Christians to fight and spill bloud about: and since it doth not manifestly appeare how or when it was first purchased, or by what Law conveyed to us, we take notice of it only as matter of wit and disputation. As it is an honour to be masters of the Sea, and to make others strike saile to us as they passe; its a glory fitter for women and children to wonder at, then for States-men to contend about. It may bee compared to a chaplet of flowers, not to a diadem of gold: but as it is a profit to us to fence and inclose the Sea, that our neighbours shall not surprise us unawares; its matter of moment, yet it concernes us but as it doth other Nations: by too insolent contestations hereupon. wee may provoke God, and dishonour our selves: we may more probably incense our friends, then quell our enemies, we may make the land a slave to the sea, rather than the sea a servant to the land; but I pray Master Selden to pardon me for this transition, and I returne my matter: if the Kingdome could not possibly subsist without Ship-money in such a danger, yet there is no necessity that the king should be so sole Judge of that danger, as that he may judge therein contrary to the opinion, and perhaps, knowledge of other men. I allow the King to be supreame, and consequently sole Judge in all cases whatsoever, as to the right, and as to the diffusion of Judgement; but as to the exercise and restraint of judgement, he is not, nor ought not to be accounted sole Judge. In matters of Law the King must create Judges, and sweare them to judge uprightly and impartially, and for the subject against himselfe, if Law so require, yea, though he be of contrary judgement himselfe, and by his Letters sollicite the contrary. The Kings power is as the disgestive faculty in nature, all parts of the body contribute heat to it for their owne benefit, that they may receive backe againe from it a better concocted and prepared supply of nourishment, as it is their office to contribute, so it is the stomacks to distribute.

And questionlesse sole judgement in matters of State, does no otherwise belong to the King, then in matters of Law or points of Theologie, Besides as sole judgement is here ascribed to the King, he may affirme dangers to be foreseene when he will, and of what nature he will: if he say onely, Datum est nobis inteligi, as he does in his Writ, &c. To his sole indisputable judgement it is left to say charges as often and as great as he pleases. And by this meanes if he regard not his word more than his profit, he may in one yeare draine all the Kingdome of all its treasure, and leave us the most despicable slaves in the whole world.

It is ridiculous also to alleage, as J. Jones does, that it is contrary to presumption of Law to suspect falsity in the King: for if Law presume that the King will not falsly pretend danger to vex his subjects, of his owne meere motion, yet no Law, nor reason, nor policy will presume, that the King may not be induced by mis-information to grieve the people without cause. The Sunne is not more visible than this truth, our best Kings, King Charles, King James, Queene Elizabeth, and all the whole ascending line, have done undue illegall things sometimes, contrary to the rights and Franchises of England, being mis-informed, but having consulted with the Judges or States in Parliament, they have all retracted and confessed their error. Nay there is nothing more knowne, or universally assented to than this, that Kings may be bad; and it is more probable and naturall, that evill may be expected from good Princes, than good from bad. Wherefore, since it is all one to the State, whether evill proceed from the King mediately or immediately, out of malice or ignorance: and since wee know that of all kinds of government Monarchicall is the worst, when the Scepter is wielded by an unjust and unskillfll Prince, though it be the best, when such Princes as are not seduceable (a thing most rare) reigne, it will be great discretion in us not to desert our right in those Lawes which regulate and confine monarchie, meerly out of Law presumption; if we must presume well of our Princes, to what purpose are Lawes made : and if Lawes are frustrate and absurd, wherein doe we differ in condition from the most abject of all bond-slaves?

There is no tyranny more abhored than that which hath a controlling power over all Law, and knowes no bounds but its owne will: if this be not the utmost of Tyranny, the Turks are not more servile than we are: and if this be Tyranny, this invention of ship-money makes us as servile as the Turks. We must of necessity admit, that our Princes are not to be mis-led, and then our Lawes are needlesse: or that they may be misse-led, and then our Lawes are uselesse. for if they will listen to ill councell, they may bee mooved to pretend danger causlesly; and by this pretence defeate all our Lawes and liberties, and those being defeated, what doth the English hold, but at the Kings meere discretion, wherein doth he excell the Captives condition? if wee shall examine why the Mahometan slaves are more miserably treated, then the Germans, or why the French Pesants are so beggerly, wretched, and bestially used more then the Hollanders, or why the people of Millaine, Naples, Sicily are more oppressed, trampled upon, and inthralled then the Natives of Spayne? there is no other reason will appeare but that they are subject to more immoderate power, and have lesse benefit of law to releeve them.

In nature there is no reason, why the meanest wretches should not enjoy freedome, and demand justice in as ample measure, as those whom law hath provided for: or why Lords which are above law should bee more cruell then those which are more conditionate: yet wee see it is a fatal kind of necessity onely incident to immoderate power, that it must bee immoderately used: and certainly this was well knowne to our ancestoers, or else they would not have purchased their charters of freedome with so great an expence of blood as they did, and have endured so much so many yeeres rather then to bee betrayd to immoderate power, and prerogative: let us therefore not bee too carelesse of that, which they were so jealous of, but let us look narrowly into the true consequence of this ship-scot, whatsoever the face of it appeare to bee. It is value to stop twenty leakes in a ship, and then to leave one open, or to make lawes for the restraynt of loyalty all other wayes, that it may not overflow the estates of the comminalty at pleasure, and yet to leave one great breach for its irruption.

All our Kings hitherto have beene circumscribed by law, that they could not command the goods of their subjects at pleasure without common consent: but now if the King be but perswaded to pretend danger, hee is uncontroleable Master of all wee have, one 'datum est intelligi', shal make our 'English Statutes' like the politicke hedge of Gore-ham, and no better: I doe not say that this King will falsifie, it is enough that wee all, and all that wee have are at his discretion if hee will falsifie, though vast 'power' bee not 'abused', yet it is a great mischiefe that it may, and therefore vast 'power' it selfe is justly odious, for divers reasons. first, because it may fall into the hands of ill disposed 'Princes', such as were K. John, Henry the third, Edward the second, Richard the second. These all in their times made England miserable, and certainely had their power beene more unconfineable they had made it more miserable. The alterations of times doe not depend upon the alteration of the people, but of Princes: when Princes are good it fares wel with the people when bad ill.

'Princes' often vary, but the people is alwaies the same in all ages, and capable of smal, or no variations: If 'Princes' would endure to heare this trueth it would bee profitable for them, for flatterers alwaies rayse jealousies against the people; but the trueth is, the people as the sea, have no turbulent motion of their owne, if 'Princes' like the windes doe not raise them into rage. Secondly, vast power if it finde not bad 'Princes' it often makes 'Princes' bad: it hath often charged 'princes', as it did 'Nero' from good to bad, from bad to worse: but 'Vespasian' is the Onely noted man which by the Empire was in 'melius mutatus': daily experience teaches this. 'Dangelt in England' within 20. yeares increased unto a four-fold proportion.

Subsididies were in former times seldome granted, and few at a time, now parliaments are helde by some to be of no other use then to grant them.

The Fox, in Esop, observed that of all the Beasts which had gone to visite the Lyon, few of their foot-steps were to be seene retrorsum, they were all printed adversum. And we find at this day, that it is farre more easie for a King to gaine undue things from the people, then it is for the people to re-gaine its due from a King: This King hath larger Dominions, and hath raigned yet fewer years, and enoyed quieter times then Queene Elizabeth: And yet his taxations hath beene farre greater, and his Exploits lesse honourable, and the yet people is still helde in more jealousie.

To deny shippe-mony which sweeps all, is held and accounted a rejection of naturall Allegiance. I speake not this to render odious the Kings blessed government, God forbid, I hold him one of the mildest, and most gracious of our Kings: And I instance in him the rather, that we may see, what a bewitching thing flattery is, when it touches uppon this string of unlimitable power: if this ambition and desire of vast power were not the most naturall, and forcible of all sinnes, Angels in Heaven, and man in Paradize had no falne by it; but since it is, Princes: themselves ought to be the more cautious and cautilous of it.

Thirdly, vast power if it neither find nor make bad Princes, yet it makes the good governement of good Princes the lesse pleasing, and the lesse effectuall, for the common and publicke good: And therefore it is a rule both in Law, and Policy, and Nature, Non recurrendum est ad extraordinaria, in jis quae sieri possant perordinaria: All extraordinary aides are horrid to the people, but most especially such as the Ship-Scot is, whereby all liberty is over-throwne, and all Law subjected unto the Kings meer discretion.

Queene Elizabeth in eighty eight was victorious without this Taxation, and I am fully perswaded she was therefore Victorious the rather, because she used it not. Her Arte was to account her subjects hearts as her unfailing Exchequer, and to purchase them by doing legall just thing, and this Arte never failed nor deceived her, and in that dismall gust of danger, it was good for her and the whole State, both that she did not relye upon forced aides of money, or the swords of grieved souldiers: For this Ship-money, nothing can be pretended but necessity, and certainly necessity is ill pretended; when the meere doing of the thing, is as dangerous as that for which it is done: did not this ship-scot over-throw all popular Liberty, and so threaten as great a mischiefe as any Conquest can? And were not the people justly averse from it? Yet meerly for the peoples disaffection to it, it is dangerous to be relied upon in case of great danger.

Wee know Nature teacheth us all, Of two Evils to chuse that which wee thinke the least, though it bee not so; therefore if the people apprehend this Remedy as a Thing worse then the Disease, though they be mistaken therein, yet that very mistake may proove fatall.

The Roman Army beeing harshly treated by Senators, and their proud Generall, did refuse to charge upon the Enemy, or to resist the charge of the Enemy, they chose rather to be slaughtered by Strangers, then Enthralled by their Country-men. The English also in the late Scotsh invasion, by reason of this and many other causes of Discontent, made so faint resistance, that they did almost in a manner confesse, That they held themselves as miserable already, as the Scots could make them.

Thus wee see there is no necessity of levying Ship-money, there is rather necessity of Repealing it: And we see that presumption of Law doth not abet this Necessity, but rather crosse it. And whereas J.Jones further saith, That the Kings Majesty hath no benefit by ship-money, and therefore presumption is the stronger, that the King will not take it causelesly. We may answere: The ship mony is a great benefit unto the King: For if not immediatly, yet mediatly it is become a Revenew, inasmuch as by this Additional other Revenues of the Crowne, nay, and Tunnage and Poundage, which were not designed only for ordinary Expences, but for extraordinary imployments, and publicke charges also, are now become discharged of that tie, and the Common-Wealth hath quite lost all its intrest and property in them. In point of benefit therefore it is all one to the Kings Majesty, and in point of burthen, it is all one to the subject, whether Ship-money be accounted of as part of the kings annuall Rents; or no, since by it his rents are enlarged: And as to the subject there is no obligation, that this Levy shal not hereafter incorporate with the rest of the Kings Majesties Intradoes, and be swallowed up as Tunnage and Poundage now are. Thus we see what the Necessity is, and presumption of Law, which was so much insisted uppon; and yet for a further confutation of both, Time, the mother of Truth, hath now given us more light Now that great danger which was pretended so many yeares together for the necesssity of raysing so great supplies of treasure, is a small cloud blown over, making it apparant that Kings may bee mis informed; and by mis information take Molehils for Mountaines, and cast heavie burthens upon their subjects.

3. But I come now to my third Difficulty, how a publick charge is to be laid upon the Kingdome. The law runs generally, that in England no Tollage or pecuniary charge may bee imposed Forsque per common assent de tout la Realme, or, sinon per common consent de Parliement. Some presidents, or matters of fact appeare, wherein some Kings have divers times invaded this right of the subject, but upon conference had with the  Judges, or petition in Parliament, redresse was ever made, and the subjecs right re-established. All the colour which can be brought to answer the Law in our case, is, that the words of the law are generall Taxes and Tollages, but doe not by special mention restrain extraordinary impositions, in time of extraordinary danger. But wee know the petition of Right, 3. Car. is grounded upon former statutes, and recites divers of them, and is a cleare affirmance of the common right of England; and yet by that the commissions for Loanes were damned: and it is evident that those Loanes were demanded for the generall defence of the Kingdome in time of imminent danger; and by the same statute, not onely Loanes, but all other levies of money upon what pretence of danger soever, sinon per common consent, are condemned as illegall, and contrary to the Lawes and Rights of England. Two things therefore are objected against Parliaments: First, that they are to slow motion, and so most of the judges alledge. Secondly, that they may be perverse, and refuse due aid to the King, and so I. Crawley boldly suggests. For answere wee say in generall: First, that it is the wisdome of Kings to bee alwayes vigilant, and to have their eyes so open upon forraign princes, and to maintaine such intelligence that no preparation from abroade may surprize them before recourse had to Parliament; and this is very easie to insular princes, who have a competent strength of shipping, secondly, to have alwayes in readinesse against all sudden surprizes, a sufficient store of ammunition and arms both for sea and land-service: and the revenues of the Crowne of England are sufficient for this purpose, and have beene held more then sufficenent in former times, when hostility was greater, and the Kingdome smaller. thirdly, to seeke advice and assistance from Parliaments, frequently in times of quiet, as well as of danger, as well when warre is but smoaking, or kindling, as when it is blown into a flame. Before the conquest this was held policie, and since in Edward the thirds time, a statute past to this purpose; and if parliaments of late bee growne into dislike, it is not because their vertue is decaid, it is because the corruption of the times cannot endure such sharpe remedies. Fourthly, to speake particularly of this case of ship-money wee say that it is a course more slow then by parliament: there was more expedition used in parliament to supply King Charles, since hee came to the Crowne, then can this way. And wee say moreover, that as the extremity of the Kingdome was when ship-money was demanded, whatsoever was pretended to the contrary, a parliament might have been timely enough called, and seasonably enough supplied the King. As to the second objection of I. Crawly, too unfit to come out of any honest wise mans mouth, but much more for a Judges, Judge Crooke replies, that as there is nullum iniquum in Lege, so niether in parliamento. The three noted factions which are adverse to parliaments, are the papists, the prelates, and court parasites; and these may bee therefore supposed to hate parliaments, because they knowe themselves hatefull to parliaments. It is scarse possible for the King to finde out any other that thinkes ill of Parliaments, of is ill thought of by Parliaments. Of papists little neede to bee said, their enmity is confest, they have little to pretend for themselves, but that parliaments are growne puritannicall. The prelates thinke themselves not to have jusisdiction and power enough; and they knowe that Parliaments thinke they have too much, and abuse that which they have much more: therefore to uphold themselves, and to crush their ill-willers, they not only tax Parliaments of puritanisme, but all puritans of sedition: as much as in them lies, they wed the King to their quarrell, perswading him that Parliaments out of puritanisme, do not so much aime at the fall of Episcopacie, as Monarchy, and that Episcopacie is the support of Monarchy, so that both must stand and fall together. How beit because they cannot upbraide Parliaments of attempting any thing against Monarchy further then to mainetaine due liberty, therefore they preach an unlimitable prerogative, and condemne all law of liberty as injurious to Kings, and incompatible with Monarchy. Manwarring denies Parliamentary power and honour, Cowell denies propriety of goods, further then at the Kings discretion, and Harrison accuses Judge Hutton of delivering law against Gods Law, in the case of Ship-money. And the common Court doctrine is, that Kings are boundlesse in authority, and that they onely are cesars friends which justifie that doctrine; and from this doctrine hath growne all the jealousies of late betweene the King and his best subjects; and this is that venemous matter which hath laien burning, and ulcerating inwardly in the bowels of the common-wealth so long. The other enemies of Parliaments, are Court dependants, and projectors, which have taken advantage of this unnaturall dissention betwixt the King and his Subjects; and have found out meanes to live upon the spoile of both, by siding with the King, and beeing instruments to extend his prerogative to the purchasing of preferment to themslves, disaffection to the King, and vexation to the common-wealth: These three factions excepted, and some few Courtiers which are carryed with the current of example, or are left to speake unpleasing trueths, there is scarce any man in all the Kings dominions, which doth not wish for parliaments, as the States best physick, nay almost as its naturall necessary food: but I will instance in three things wherein parliaments excell all other Councells whatsoever.

1. For wisedome, no advice can bee given so prudent, so profound, so universally comprehending, from any other author; it is truely sayd by Sir Robert Cotten, that all private single persons may deceive and bee deceived; but all cannot deceive one, nor one all.

That an inconsiderable number of privadoes should see or knowe more then whole Kingdomes, is incredible: vox populi was ever reverenced at vox Dei, and Parliaments are infallible, and their acts indisputable to all but Parliaments. It is a just law, that no private man must bee wiser then Law publickly made. Our wisest Kings in England, have ever most relied upon the wisedome of Parliaments.

Secondly, no advice can bee so faithfull, so loyall, so religious and sincere, as that which proceeds from parliaments, where so many are gathered together for Gods service in such a devout manner, we cannot but expect that God should bee amongst them: and as they have a more especiall blessing promised them; so their ends cannot bee so sinister: private men may thrive by alterations: and common calamities, but the common body can effect nothing but the common good, because nothing else can bee commodious for them.

Sir Robert Cotton in the life of Henry the third, according to the Court Doctrine at this present, saies, that in parliament Kings are ever lesse then they should be, and the people more. If this bee spoken of irregular Kings, which will endure to heare of nothing but prerogative government, it may cary some semblance of trueth: but sure it is, good and wise Kings are ever greatest when they sit immured, as it were, in that honourable Assembly: as the Historie of Queene Elizabeth and many of her progenitors testifies. Tis true, K. Henry the third, met with divers oppositions in Parliament: Hee was there upbrayded, and called dilapidator regni; it was true that hee was so, and the most unworthy of rule that ever fate in this Throne; yet those words became not subjects: I doe not justifie, but in some part extenuate such misdemeanors; for the chiefe blame of those times is not to bee throwne upon the peeres and commons, but upon the King and his out-landish parasites. It is without all question also that in those bloudy unjust times, had it not beene for frequent parliaments; and that soveraigne remedy which thereby was applyed to the bleeding wounds of the Kingdome, no other helpe could have stanched them.

Even then, when parliaments were most prevelent, and when they had so much provocation from so variable an uncapable a Prince, they did not seeke to conditionate prerogative, or to depresse Monarchy for the future, though they were a little to injurious to him in person for the present.

Since that time also many Parliaments have had to struggle for the due liberty with insolent princes, and have had power to clip the wings of Royalty; and the custome of all Europe almost besides hath seemed to give such countenance to such attempts; but the deepe wisedome, & inviolable loyalty of Parliaments to this composure of governement hath bin such, that they never made any invasion upon it. As it was in all former ages, so it now remaines intire with all its glorious ensignes of honour, and all the complements of power; and may hee be as odious which seekes too alter or diminish Monarchicall governement for the future, as he which seekes to make it infinite, and slanders Parliaments as enemies to it, or endeavers to blow such jealousies into the Kings eares.

3. No advice can bee fit, so forcible, so effectuall for the publicke welfare, as that which is given in Parliament: if any Cabinet Counsellours could give as wise sincere advice as Parliaments, yet it could not bee so profitable, because the hearts of the people doe not goe along with any other, as with that.

That King which is potent in Parliament, as any good King may, is as it were so inskonsed in the hearts of his subjects, that he is almost beyond the trayns or aimes of treason and rebellion at home, nay forraign hostility cannot peirce him, but through the sides of all his people.

It ought to bee noted also, that the English have ever beene the most devoted servants coequall, sweetly-moderate Soveraignty; so in our English Parliaments, where the Nobility is not too prevalent, as in Denmark, nor the Comminalty, as in the Netherlands, nor the King, as in France, Justice and policie kisse and embrace more lovingly then elsewhere. And as all the three States have alwayes more harmoniously born their just proportionsable parts in england then elsewhere, so now in these times, in these learned, knowing, religious times, we may expect more blessed counsell from Parliaments then ever we received heretofore. May it therefore sinke into the heart of our King to adhere to Parliaments, and to abhorre the grosse delusive suggestions of such as disparage that kinde of Councell. May he rather confide in that Community which can have no other end but their owne happinesse in his greatnessse, then in Papists, Prelates, and Projectors, to whom the publick disunion is advantangious. May he affect that gentle Prerogative which stands with the happinesse, freedome, and riches of his people; and not that terrible scepter which does as much avert the hearts, as it doth debilitate the hands, and exhaust the purses of his Subjects. May be at last learne by experience, that the grievance of all grievances, that that mischiefe which makes all mischiefes irremediable, and almost hopelesse in England at this day, is that Parliaments are clouded, and disused, and suffered to be calumniated by the ill bonding incendiaries of our State. May it lastly enter into his beleefe, that it is impossible for any Kingdome to deny publicke assent for their Princes ayd, either in Parliament or our, when publicke danger is truly imminent, and when it is fairely required, and not by projects extorted; that no nation can unnaturally seeke its owne ruine, but that all Kings, like constantine, may make their Subjects purses their owne private coffers, if they will demand due things, as due times, and by due meanes.

4. I come now to the last difficulty about the condition and nature of such aydes as are due by Law from the Subject to the King, Though much have beene argued both at the barre and on the Bench, for the King, that he may raise moneyes from his Subjects, without consent by Law, Prerogative, and necessity. Yet at last, because the Petition of Right absolutely crosses this tenet, it is restored to us backe againe, and yeelded, that the King may not impose a pecuniary charge by way of Tollage, but onely a personall one by way of service. And now all our controversie ends in this, that we must contest, whether the Ship-scot be a pecunaiary, or a personall charge: For though the intent of the Writ, and the office of the Sheriffe be to raise moneyes onely, yet the words of the Writ, and the pretence of State, is to build and prepare Ships of warre. The Kingdome generally takes this to be a meere delusion and imposture, and doubtlesse it is but a picklock tricke, to overthrow all liberty and propriety of goods, and it is a great shame that so many judges should be abetters to such fraudulent practice contrived against the State. It is not lawfull for the King to demand moneyes as moneyes, but it is lawfull to demand moneyes under another wrong name, and under this wrong name all former Lawes and Liberties shall be as absolutely cancelled, as if they had beene meere cobwebs, or enacted onely out of meere derision. If former lawes made to guard propriety of goods were just, and grounded upon good reason, why are they by this grosse fallacie, or childish abuse defeated. If they were not just, or reasonable, what needes such a fond subtiltie as this? why should they not be fairely avoided by Law? Why were they made at all? But be this invention what it will, yet we see it is new; if it be quashed, the State is but where it was, we are still as our Ancestors left us; and since our preceeding Kings never heretofore put it in use in the most necessitous calamitous times, we may from hence inferre, that the plea of State necessity falls off of it selfe; if we admit not of this innovation, then the State suffers not; but if we admit it, no necessity being of it, we can frame no other reason for our so doing, but that our former franchises and priviledges were unjust, and therefore this way they must be annulled. Some of our Judges doe prove, that if this were a personall service, yet it were void; and they cite the case of Barges, and Ballingers vessells, built truly for Warre in time of imminent danger, and yet these charges upon complaint made by the Subject, were revoked, and disclaimed. But here in this case many other enormities and defects in Law are, for if ships be intended to be built in Inland Countries, a thing impossible is injoyned; and if moneys be aimed at, that vey ayme is against Law: and if the Kingdome were to be disfranchised, it were not to be done by an illegall way.

Besides, in the Writ, in the Assessement, in the sheriffes remedy against Recusants of it, in the execution of Law, by, or after judgement, many inconveniences, errors, and mischiefes arise many wayes: and sure take the whole case as it is, and since the Creation no whole Kingdome was ever cast in such a cause before.

Besides, though the Judges ought wholly to have been themselves upon this, to have proved this a personall service, and no pecuniary charge; they have roved after necessity, presumption of Law, and Prerogative, and scarce said any thing at all hereof.

My Lord Bramston argues very eagerly, that personall services by Sea and Land are due to the King in cases of extremity, and all their records, cases, and presidents prove no more, and that men may be arrayed, and ships pressed, and that sumptibus populi; but there is nothing proved that the meere raising of moneyes in this case, is a personall service. I. Jones indeed argues to this purpose; if the Law intrust the King with so great a power over mens persons, why not over their estates? There is cleare reason for the contrary: because the King, if he should abuse mens personall aides, could not inrich or profit himselfe thereby, and we know it is gaine and profit, it is Auri sacra fames which hath power over he breasts of men. It is not ordinary for Tyrants to imbattaile hoasts of men, and make them charge upon the Sea billowes, and then to gather up Cockles and Piwinckle shells in lieu of spoile, as one did once: but the World abounds with stories of such Princes, as have offended in abusing their power over mens estates, and have violated all right divine and humane, to attaine to such a boundlesse power.

Good Kings are sometimes weake in coveting boundlesse power; some affect rivalry with God himselfe in power, and yet places that power in doing evill, not good: for few Kings want power to doe good, and therefore it misbecomes not sometimes good subjects to be jealous in somethings of good Kings. But I. Jones Farther sayes, that Ships must be built, and without money that cannot be done: ergo. This necessity hath beene answered, and disroved already: and I now adde, that for the good of the Kingdome there is more necessity that Ship-money be damned then maintained. Such unnaturall slavery seemes to mee to be attendant upon this all devouring project, and such infamy to our Ancestors, our Lawes, and our selves, nay, and such danger to the King and his prosterity, that I cannot imagine how any forreigne conquest should induce any thing more to be detested and abhorred.

Those Kings which have beene most covetous of unconsined immoderate power, have beene the weakest in judgement, and commonly their lives have beene poore and toylsome, and their ends miserable, and violent: so that if Kings did rightly understand their owne good, none would more shunne uncontrollable absolutenesse then themselves.

How is the King of France happy in his great Prerogative? or in that terrible stile of the King of Asses? Wee see that his immoderate power makes him oppresse his poore pesants, for their condition is most deplorable, and yet set his power aside, and there is no reason why he should not be as a Father to cherish them, as a God to confort them, not as an enemy to impoverish them as a tormentor to afflict them.

2. His oppression makes him culpable before God: he must one day render a sad account for all the evill which he hath imposed, for all the good which he hath not procured to them. That the Vicegerent of God should doe the office of a tyrant, will be no light thing one day.

3. His finne makes him poore: for were his Pesants suffered to get wealth and enjoy it, the whole Land would be his treasury, and that treasury would containe twice as much as now it doth.

4. His poverty makes him impotent, for money being the sinewes of warre, how strong would his joynts be, if all his subjects were abounding in money, as doubtlesse they would, if they wanted not liberty, and propriety? besides, poverty depresses the spirit of a nation: and were the King of France, King of an Infantery, as he is onely of a Cavalrie, were he a King of men, as he is onely of beasts, had he a power over hearts as he hath over hands, that Country would be twice as puissant as it is.

5. His impotence, together with all other irregularities, and abuses is like to make his Monarchy the lesse durable. civill wars have ever hitherto infected and macerated that goodly Countrey, and many times it hath been near it's ruine: it now enjoyes inward peace, but it doth no great exploits abroad, nor is ever likely to doe, unlesse by practising upon the distemper of other nations: should some other Prince practise in the like manner upon that, and propose liberty to the grieved people, much advantage might be taken: but these avisoes would better proceed from that most heroick, most terrible, most armipotent Churchman, which effects such great wonders here: wee see hence that Princes by some gaine lose, as the whole body pines by the swelling of the spleene: we see that Rehoboam catcht an immoderate power, as the Dog in the fable at a shadow, but in stead of an uncertain nothing, he let fall and lost a certaine substance; and yet flatterers have scarce any other baite then this shadow of immoderate power, whereby to poison the phantasies of weake humours, undiscerning rash Princes.

My humble motion therefore is: First, that the judgement gven in the Chequer Chamber for Ship-money, may bee reversed, and damned, as contrary to the right of the Subject.

Secondly, that those judges which adhered to equity and integrity in this case, might have some honourable guerdon designed them.

Thirdly, that some dishonourable penalty may bee imposed upon those Judges which ill advised the King herein, and then argued as Pleaders, not as Judges; especially if any shall appeare to have solicited the betraying of the Kingdome.

Fourthly, that the meaning of our Lawes & Charters, may bee fully and expresly declared, and the force and vertue of Statutes and publicke Grants, may be vindicated from all such exceptions and objections as have beene particularly or generally made against them.

Fifthly, that a clearer solution may be given in the foure maine points stirred, how farre prerogative is arbitrary and above Law; and how farre naturall Allegeance bindes to yeeld to all demands not of parliament: next, how the King is sole Judge of danger, as that his meere cognizance thereof shall be sufficient, though there be no appearance or probability thereof. Next, how a necessity of publicke ruine must be concluded now, if Ship-money be not levied, when no such ruine hath been formerly, when this new plot was not devised. Lastly, how this Ship-Scot pretending ships, but intending money, and reallly raising the same, can be said to be no pecuniary tollage within our statutes, but a meere personall service.

Sixthly, that any Officers, or Ministers of State, which shall attempt to lay the like taxes hereafter upon the Subject, by vertue of the like void warrants, may be held and taken as Felons, or Traytors, or forcible intruders.

Seventhly, that something may be inacted against forraigne and domesticall Forces also, if they shall be congregated for the like purposes; and that the subject may be inabled by some fit and timely remedy to be given against a military kinde of government.

Eighthly, that the due way of publicke defence, in case of imminent and eminent danger, or actuall necessary warre, for the pressing of men, and other charges of warre, such as Cote and Conduct money, and all doubts thereabouts, may be made more certaine, and settled for the time to come.

Ninthly, that if the Kings ordinary Revenues now taken for the Crowne, be not sufficient to maintaine him, as our great Master, some legall order may be taken therefore, and that he may be sensible of his Subjects loyalty, and his Subjects live safe under him, that his enemies may finde him considerable, and his true friend usefull.

FINIS.

A DISCOURSE Shewing In What State THE THREE KINGDOMES Are in At this present.

Printed in the yeare, 1641.

In what State the three Kingdomes are at this present.

Sir,
As the faces of all Britaine shew their hearts and inclinations, so if their hearts were glazed with a Christall, they would appeare fearefull of the future: were not the representative body of the State carefull to cure the present malady, purge the distempered humours and save the much gangrend body, by cutting some rotten and putrifide members off; which infect, infest and invade the republique; this makes me cheerefull to discover the conceptions of the wife, and not as an Orator, but relate their opinion as their auditor: I hope it will take away from me ostentation, and trouble from the reader even to give ease of discourse.

Their profound sighes and earnest prayers might quicken my ingenie, better than the sound of excellent instruments can revive the spirit; to present this with all obedience to my Soveraigne, and faith to the Country, and declare what is convenient to be done at this time, submitting my self modestly to head and body.

Now if those streame of teares and sweet perfumes, make not my penne fruitfull and odoriserous, pardon my rudenesse, and consider the state we are now in.

When our miserable condition perceived (before the accesse of the universall body) by the wrinckles, put on the brow of ruined affaires, councell weakned, and reputation of State blasted, that the people crie out against such instruments; what miserable condition are wee brought to? Oh God! suffer not ill Councellors to be as a bad spleene, to swell so big as to make leane the Common-wealth that our empty purses bee not filled with bloud, though with teares - wherefore I humbly beseech the head to produce such effect, as the Sunne on most and cold grounds, to reduce the generall capacity to such an influence of Justice, Peace, Religion and liberty; and that in lieu thereof, the people may make him a rich and potent King. [some missing words]

As all Rivers returne to the Ocean, so shall the Laborinth we are in, be by the helpe of wise Ariadnes escaped, and the golden [missing words] of Gospell, Justice, Peace and [missing words] with helpe of those godly Medeas, be preserved and procured: Therefore not as a Lawyer, give mee leave as a welwisher to the State, to put the case by way of supposition.

If the fundamentall Lawes bee quite overthrowne, Religion altered, the nobility taken away by counsells of warre ( as the Lord Mount Noris Should have beene) the meaner sort used as Pryn, Burton & Bastwick; the propriety of goods taken away from the subject; an Army force an Arbitrary way of government, and justice bought & sold; what misery will follow? when the Judges shall affirm it legall, the Clergie wrongfully in their Pulpits teach it, and the Cabinet councell authorize the conveniency for matter of State; therefore to have our Lawes established, Religion maintained, the pride of Prelates abased, Justice administred, Liberty settled and Peace continued for after times: It is necessary the king, Lords and Commons, joyne in a most severe punishment, that none in the Postea, dare to enterprise the surprise and ruine of the common good, for it is an infalllible humane, [indecipherable word 'sh   ing'] is richer in the hearts, then in the statures of his Subjects.

Surely there was never a fitter time, nor a more convenient occasion then now, when three Kingdomes unite for their owne safety; when the Scot hath an army on foote for this purpose, and the King hath promised they shall not be interrupted in their Counselles, and God requires it for his glory.

Especially when Ministers of State have begun to act this fatall Tragedy, the guiltinesse by so many lively testimonies proved, and the treason by presidents & weighty authority assured, by Law maintained, and by all the Commons house adjudged, who have power by 25. Ed.3. and when it is brought to so good a passe by the Lords, who both have Legislative power, why should not Lords and Commons bring it to perfection? that the King signe; that who shall dare to alter Religion, innovate Law, or take away liberty of the Subject, be condignly punished, and for the future, cause an expresse Law to be made on purpose, to attaint bloud, forfeit life, lands and [missing word] if any shall assay such crying exorbitances.


[missing words] law it bee high treason to kill a Commissi [missing words] Terminer, in feare of justice; 'a majore' [missing words] whole body, when a Commissioner is but one poor member of the body politique.

[missing words] To make a Law, none be capable of any place of governance, that hath or shall give such counsell, and leave the rest to the trienniall Parliament, and not graspe too much, lest all the harpies flie away.

Likewise it is necessary to make a remonstrance of the necessity of giving 300000, to the Scots, to give satisfaction to future ages, that it was no pusilanimity, but upon mature deliberation; because the evident necessity and inevitable danger cast upon us by ill counsell, justly caused it.

To the purpose, the house of Commons hath done wisely, to endeavour to clip the wings of the Clergy, that they may fly into no temporall place, whose pens and tongues have uttered such poison against the common good, and in their pride would willingly adhere to Rome, as by many superstitions it plainly appeares; they have introduced some Babilonian ceremonies, and made a bridge unto the Church by the Arminian opinion, to passe over to Popery.

The State of Venice jealous of any their members, confederating with enemies cause them to be strangled and hanged up betweene Columnes, confiscate their goods and estates, bannish their children and make them incapable of government: if for jealousie, much more for so soule acts committed, ought they dye, by the Law of God and man.

Among the Athenians, Lacedomonians and Romans; whosoever should goe about to alter the form of Government, or Lawes without publique consent, hath been ever accounted the highest Traitor; witnesse their Ostracisme, and many such exemplary punishments, used to such wretches.

If destroying the head bee high treason, then ruining the state of the body must be; for if it be suffocated with grosse spirits the head will not onely ake, but bee Apoplecticall or Lethargicall, such a sympathy or rather relation is betwixt head and members, that no Rhetorique or eloquence can take it away: In this case it is no pitty, but convenient to destroy the brood of such vipers, and by our Law the intention makes it treason. but how many waies the Lord of Strafford hath perpetrated this intention, hath been often proved.

In 18. and 21. 'laoobi', The whole house adjudged it treason, to alien the hearts of the Subjects from the Soveraigne, which hath beene done by his counsellors. His imprisoning without Law, was high Treason, in Sir Haukin Hanby 25.B.3.Art.61. who was drawne, hanged and quartered.


Judge Thorpe forgiving such an oath contrary to law, was high Treason; and is not his?

The reason Rich.2. was deposed (plainly manifested) was because he suffered divers malefactors to escape, (condemned by Parliament) which caused the oppression of the Subjct and ruine of the Kingdome.

In all ages a Lethargy in Kings hath caused their ruine: witnesse Ed.2.Rich.2. and 11.6. (I humbly desire God to blesse his Majesty.) But consider wee, that the three Kingdomes wil not be satisfied unlesse the wrong received be expiated with the oblation of some, have caused a heretick condition.

The Lord of Strafford hath had consell in case of treason, when none hath had the like since the Conquest.

So the whole world may see with what temper, gravity and patience they proceed.

Ed. Earle of Northumberland, in the 8. of Rich.2. (because his Deputy let the Scots take Barwick Castle) was condemned of high Treason, and yet he never consented thereunto, for it was done without his privity; but the Lord of Strafford writ to the Major of Newcastle to let in the Scots, and caused the Arms to be taken away from the foure adjacent Counties, making them incapable of defence.

Wherefore it is visible as the sunne, he is guilty, besides his other crimes; now his delay of punishment had kindled such a fire, as all the Subjects of the three Kingdomes are on a flame, and wil not be satisfied:

Exparvis magna Crescent.

I pray God divert the evill, and give us true repentance.

FINIS.

Certaine QUERIES OF SOME TENDER Conscienced CHRISTIANS.

About the late Protestation, commended to them by the House of COMMONS now Assembled, in the High and Honourable Court of PALIAMENT.

Wherein they desire to bee resolved,



        1. The Authority imposing it.
Concerning    2. The Necessity of it.
        3. The Danger of it.
        4. Whether it can be taken in Faith.

            As also

Certaine Queries, concerning the Ambiguity thereof, appearing in most, if not in all the severall Branches thereof.

Together with a Form of such an interpretation of it, as may lawfully be taken, and doth not goe against the literall sence.

Written by a Learned Divine.

Printed 1641.

The Queries of certaine tender-Conscienced Christians, concerning the late protestation, commended to them by the House of Commons, now assembled in the High and honoruable Court of Parliament, wherein they humbly crave a cleere satisfaction from their abler brethren, that they may take with a well grounded and cleere Conscience.

First, as concerning the authority of it, whether it comes sufficiently authorised to be imposed upon any, unlesse by the joynt consent of his sacred majesty, and both houses of that high and honourable Court, both head and members? We do not hereby intend to charge any with the guilt of combination against Authority; but in the tendernesse of our conferences, humbly to signifie our just scruples, about the authority imposing it, and the contents of it; if it be said it is not to be imposed on any, then we hope none can justly blame us, for using our lawfull liberty, and refusall of that which is not imposed on us.

Secondly, concerning the Necessity of it; what need is there of urging or taking protestation at this time; since Oathes, sacred Bonds, are not to be taken without urgent necessity, unlesse wee will take the name of God in Vaine: and though the prudence of the contrivers may see a necessity to commend it, yet it is no wonder if such silly ones as we, see not the necessity of taking it, untill they shall be pleased to impart their reasons. the conscientious will hold themselves bound to maintaine the Doctrine established, power of parliaments, and liberty of subjects without it all others will slight it: we thinke in all humility love a stronger bond then compulsion, and other meanes more effectuall for holding out of Popery, namely, diligent Preaching, Prayer, Humiliation, and Reformation, whereby we may encrease in the knowledge of the truth, and the ability to defend us against the enemies of it. But for Ministers it seemes lesse needfull, who have already subscribed and sworne, and subscribed to the Doctrine of the Church of England against Popery, against whom sufficient Provisoes are made in case they revolt.

3. Thirdly, what danger by multiplyng Oathes, where divers for feare may be forced to take them, Reluctante conscientia. Most do make too little conscience of them, and may endanger the Land by drawing on it a judgement for their slighting such a sacred bond, or violation of it, for Oathes the Land mournes, Icr.25.10. Whereupon saint Austin in his second sermon, Deverbis Apostoli, Falsa juratio exitiosa, vera juratiosericulosa, nulla juratio secura est. Above all things my Brethren sweare not, Isaiah 5.12.

4. Fourthly, whether can this Oath be taken in faith without which, whatsoever we doe is sin, Rom. 14. 23. Now this Oath comprehends so many things of severall kinds, and divers of them unknowne to most of us, that though wee be ready to beleeve and receive some of them single, yet our faith cannot fathome all together, and so we cannot sweare without doubting- And surely doubtfull swearing, is as dangerous as doubtfull eating: every Oath should be taken in truth, Righteousnesse and judgement. Icr.4.2. How can we take an Oath in judgement, not having a full perswasion in the meaning of it; or how can others with good Conscience presse it on us, till they give us full satisfaction herein?


If it be answered that the Creed, &c. are ambiguous; subject to doubtfull Interpretations, as appeares in divers Articles, yet upon this reason, may not bee refused to be sworne to this, the learned Divines of Aberdine have given sufficient answer. pag.50. of their Duplice: these are of Divine Authority, or next Divine, agreeable to the word, approved by the uniforme concern of all places in all ages. Whereupon wee are undoubtedly perswaded that the contrivers of them did neither intend, nor yet set downe any untruth, and therefore we doe submit to the infallible authority of them (though somethings be controverted in them) whereas we cannot suppose the same in any Oath contrived by men, subject to errors, wanting that generall approbation.

The Ambiguity of the OATH appeares to us in most, if not in all the severall Branches of it.

1. I Promise, Vow, and Protest, to maintaine with my Life, goods, and Power, the true Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the church of England. Quere, What is the Doctrine of the Church of England? Whether that in the 39 Articles? Why is it not specfied, that we may know to what we sweare? Whether may it not be extended to that which hereafter shall be established; since in the oath it is not (now expressed, or already established) but, Expressed, in the Doctrine of the Church of England; which we suppose will bind us, if expessed hereafter; if so; None will set his seale to a blanke bond, so as the Obligee may make his debt as large as he listeth: and we conceave wee should bee more cautelous in engaging our selves by Oath, then our Estate by Bond, since the tye is more vigorous, and the breach more dangerous. Ley.pag.55.


2. I swear to maintain this Doctrine against all popery, and popish innovations. Quere, in what extent is Popery here abjur'd? Whether onely in doctrinals, and such onely as are fundamentall, or come nigh the foundation? or to remoter superstructions undermined? Wherein it hath alwayes bin held lawfull for Scholars to vary, and 'abundare fenfu fue'. Whether to Discipline also? and hath not Episcopacy bin branded for a Popish Hierarchie, and the Ministers ordained by them and standing under them. Notwithstanding it hath beene allowed by our Doctrine and established by our law? Hath not our Liturgy (though established by Act of Parliament) beene rejected as Popish? and all innocent Ceremonies (though ancienter far then Popery) if abused by them? Nay one of late, against Popish Ceremonies tells us, that an oath must be extended to the largest sense, Disput. against Engl. ceremonies,p.93.97.

3. I sweare to maintain the power and priviledge of parliaments, and the lawfull liberty and rights of subjects. Quare, What are those priviledges of Parliaments and rights of subjects? Are these evident by the light of nature, that upon notifying them, every one that sweares is able to give his assent, acknowledging them undoubted priviledges and rights? or doe they vary in diverse countries, according to the different constitutions of statutes and charters depending on positive lawes? Why are we not directed to those lawes where we may be clearely informed, what are those undoubted priviledges and rights?

4. I will maintain every person that maketh this Protestation is what he shall doe in the lawfull pursuance of the same, [missing word] Whither am I hereby bound to embroile my selfe is every private quarrell betwixt particular persons? Suppose one that hath taken this Protestation can be oppressed by some great one and pursue his [missing word]. Whether am I hereby to engage my selfe? If it is with reference to the publicke State. Whether am I alone bound to maintaine him in his rights, or only [obscured word: 'privately'? with others? And how shall I be assured that [missing word] his right, and that his pursuance is lawfull, that I may joyne with him?

5. I will oppose and bring to condign punishment, all such as shall die any thing to the contrary. Quer. Whether is his sacred Majesty and his lawfull Successors here excepted, in case they should attempt some innovation in Religion, or to infringe the liberty of Parliaments, or the rights of Subjects, or to oppose any that hath taken this Protestation? Now to take up armes against our Soveraigne, either offensive or defensive, we have not as yet learned. We neither in the Scriptures not the writings, nor practice of primitive times find any other remedy for Subjects unjustly prosecuted by Hereditary Monarches, but slight from their wrath, or patient suffering, or humble supplication with teares and prayers. Nor dare we subscribe till we see those arguments answered in the learned Duplice of the Divine of Aberdine, pag. 160. If his Majesty be excepted why is it not expressed? Nor can the expression such an exception be thought needlesse, though [missing word] where we sweare to maintaine the King.

Nor can it seeme a greater tendernesse of his Majesties Honour, to omit the exception in this clause opposing his Majesties constancy in Religion, and an stable disposition in the adminstration of Justice truly the modest request of such an exception cannot be the judgement of any reasonableman, import the tenderest suspition of his Majesties inconstancy in religion, or disposition to injustice. None are more unsettled in their good opinion of him then wee. But provide for our owne peace, in case of, dispute about the Boundaries of Religion priviledge of Parliaments and rights of Subjects. Nor doe we cast the least mention of imprudence or disloyalty upon the purveyors of this Protestation, which we doubt not but their freedomes can easily cleare, and we much crave may be cleared to us.

6. In case of dispute, what is the Religion established, power and priviledge of Parliaments, rights of Subjects, and the lawfull meanes of the pursuance of the same, or concerning the boundaries of those; who shall be judge? The dictate of every private mans conscience? That were to expose the Kingdome to personall contention; the Parliament? what if a dispute arise when no Parliament sits? The King and Counsel? or some deputed by his Majesty and the Parliament? or the stronger part?

7. I sweare never to relinquish this potestation, &c. Quere, Doth this clause bind me for ever in no case to answer? What if the King and State should find it expedient hereafter to revoake this Protestation, or some thing in it? Why is not there a reservation of liberty to change with the State? Master Ley in his booke of the late Canons, pag.86. thinks it unfit to make Median & Persian Protestantions, that cannot be altered, when as such changes may fall in a State, as the wisest law may be thought necessary to be altered, and therefore to receive no farther establishment, then may agree withall humane lawes to be left alterable.

Nor let us be thought herein to wrong our selves, forming exceptions and laying impediment sin our own way. We walke in sincerity according to our [missing word], not forging to our selves: impediments of laying stumbling blockes in our owne way, but shewing such as seeme to be layd in our way, by the incomodious expression of the Protestation. If any thinke our doubts are too many, perchance he thinks too little of the peace of conscience of private Christians, and price of Ministery.

If any inforcement should be used, our suspence, till satisfaction be given, may be charitably ascribed rather to conscience then contumacy. And therefore the case so standing, we hope we shall neither be pressed to the taking, nor our modest refusall oppressed with any penalty.

What pitty were it which some mens feares begin to suggest, that after our painefull studies in the Universities, the expence of our patrimonies in our costly education (which might have maintained us plentifully in another course). After our painfull imployments in our pastorall Church; to the tyring out of our strength. After our families encreased above our abilities to support them (without the meanes we receive from the Church) to be thrust out of all, who cannot dig, and are ashamed to beg. After our hopes of removall of all burdens to be oppressed With the same rougue that hath blest God for the heroicke zeale of that High and Honourable Countrie removall of one Oath, now to complaine of the pleasure of our consciences by another? That when such care is taken for the establishment of the right of subjects (would this Oath come hereafter to be prest it might strip us of all, which we conceive derogatory to our rights, who are not the worst Subjects. That those who have complained of subscription and onely these eighty yeares (though of such things onely were established by Parliament) should now be forward to promote this, and presse it upon others.

When divers things established by law were inconstrued, the Church and State thought it expedient to interpreat them as appeares, by divers Canons, Rubrickes and injunctions, and preface to the Common prayer. when the Oath of Supremacy was inconstrued, King James of blessed Memory, vouchsafed to cleare it by publicke writings, and after to cleare this explication from all objections of Rall and others, by Bishop Andrewes and others. When the Reverand Primate of Armagh had cleared the same Oath in Ireland, the King gave him thanks for his paines taken therein, by a Letter now Printed. And this present Parliament to remove the feare of some Londoners (as we heare) vouchsafed to set forth an interpretations of one clause of this Protestation.

Whether would it not highly commend their prudence, and eternize their goodnesse, to vouchsafe a further interpretation of all the severall branches of [missing word] authorize by speciall Commission, some grave, wise men, in every Diocesse, to admit of such interpretations as did not goe against the literall sense, and cleare it from all ambiguity.

------------------------------------------------

Whether this interpretation, or such like might be accepted.

1. I sweare to maintaine the Doctrine expressed in the Church of England, &c. I understand the Doctrine already established in the 39. Articles.

2. This Doctrine I will maintaine against all Popery and Popish innovations &c. I understand all Popery Doctrinall, and innovations practicall, contrary to the Doctrine already established.

3. I Sweare to maintaine the power and priviledge of parliaments, the rights of Subjects, &c. I understand this so farre as they shall bee evidenced to me, by the standing lawes of this Kingdome, not repugnant to the lawes of God, to be undoubted priviledges and rights, and further the maintenance of these rights of subjects, I understand not with reference to one another, to be hereby bound to imbroyle my selfe in every private mans quarrell, though I conceive right, but with reference to the publike State.

4. I will maintaine every person that maketh this Protestation, in whatsoever he shall doe in the lawfull pursuance of the same, &c. This maintenance I understand not to bind me to maintiane them by my selfe alone, but together with others consenting and lawfully authorized, the same I understand of opposing in the next clause.

5. I will oppose and bring to condigne punishment, &c. In all the severall clauses, I expressely except his sacred Majesty, and his lawfull successors, according to my Oath of Allegiance, not daring to thinke a disloyall thought, much lesse to lift up my hand against the Lords annointed.

6. I will never relinquish this Protestation, &c. Unlesse the State shall thinke it expedient to alter or revoke it, in which case I reserve my freedome.

FINIS.

A LETTER sent FROM a Private Gentleman TO A FRIEND IN LONDON,

In justification of his owne adhereing to His MAJESTIE in these times of Distraction:

With

Arguments induceing him thereunto, both from the Law of God and Man.

Printed V.N. An.Dom. 1642.

A

LETTER OF LOYALTY, with Arguments inducing thereunto, from the Lawes of God and Man.

Sir, I Have receiv'd your Letter, and the Newes you sent mee; though I have either seene or heard it all before, yet I give you many thanks for it. I would that either there were lesse newes, or better stirring. In your last letter I received nothing but chiding invectives. I wish you to examine your selfe how farre the prosession of so much faith ( as those of your opinion are full of ) can stand with so little charity, as their censoriousnesse of others expresse. I know charity is the touch-stone of faith, and the Apostle tells me, Love thinketh no evill, unlesse it be sufficiently proved. For my part I judge no man, I leave every one to himselfe to stand or fall. I may be seriously sorry for some, but I will peremptorily censure none. It shall be my indeavour to settle mine owne conscience' and to that end I shall impartially embrace all opportunities, that may either convince my conscience if corrupt, or confirme it if upright: and this taske being accomplished, I shall march on with comfort and cheerfulnesse ( though thorough the sharpest thicket of disgraces and reproach) to that period which my conscience shall point me to. And the name of a Parliament without the true subsistence of it will no more awe me, then the naked stile of a King lest my Soveraign without due honour attending it can please him. Venerable I confesse is the name of a Parliament, but that is where the nature accompanieth it: for otherwise it is but an empty shadow without a body: Kings would willingly be satisfied, whether the place where the Parliament sits, or the persons sitting in that place be the essentiall part of a true Parliament. I conceive certainly that not the place, but the persons make the Parliament; and then to admit the King no part of it (which cannot with truth be admitted) the truest definition of a Parliament I can frame to my selfe is, that a company or assembly of select persons, chosen by the free votes of the Freeholders of each County, & Freemen of each Borough, (warranted to make such election by the Kings especiall Writ) and by them intrusted to represent the affections, and all the duties of them whoso chose them. This I thinke being not to be denied for truth, it will follow that all this elect body must agree in one; or else the majority of voyces agreeing must carry it, and oblige the minority disagreeing. This being also I thinke unquestionable, I see not why majority of number, both of the House of Peeres and Commons, who by their attendence on, and obedience to the King, together with the removall of themselves for the minority residing behinde expresse their votes, their resolves what they are; ought not rather in the true nature, and fundamentall essence of the thing be honoured, knowne, and meant by the stile of Parliment, the great Councell of the King, and the representative body of the Kingdome; then that minor part so much cryed up, and doted on by these: yet I see no shift to avoide this consequent, but that it will be an inevitable conclusion, That if the majority of number of Peeres, and Parliament men which now adhere to the King may erre and be malignant, that then certainly the Votes of the maority of the representative body of the Kingdome may be erroneous, and so consequently ought not to obliege. And if the majority of voyces may, much more may the minority fall into this unhappinesse to be lyable to errors, and therefore can lesse claime obedience as a due unto them, If it be finally the residing alone in Westminster that gives them their infalibility, I see not but the Popes choice may give as good right, and make as just a claime to that priviledge. But the much experience of many former Parliaments kept in severall places of this Kingdome evidenceth sufficiently, that no such Prerogative is by nature of Parliament entayled upon Westminster.

Consider secondly, that those men are chosen but by subjects, and therefore are but to represent the affections, and act the duties of subjects; and are indeed but the representative body of Subjects: and now can it stand then with this condition, that they should impose a law, command, or rule upon their Severaigne? if they will transcend this condition, they breake the limits of all such trust as either was, or could be conferred upon them: For the Subjects that chose them, had not that power of commanding thier Soverigne in themselves, to conferre upon them. And [unreadable word] dat quod non haber [unreadable word]

thirdly, we know by the fundamentell constitution of Parliaments, the king hath in himselfe the power to dissolve them; much more hath he the power in himselfe to deny any thing propounded by them: for the power of dissolving is greaer then of denying. Now that he hath in himselfe the power of dissolving, the very Act of continuance of this Parliament is a sufficient proofe, which other wise had beene idle, and the passing it by Act had beene in the Parliament-men a betraying of the trust reposed in them, and of their own Priviledges, had they had the power of continuance in themsleves, without the Kings assent. Now if this Act of continuance passed by the king was an Act of favour, grace, and trust, let them take heed that it be not abused by them against the King, and so free him before God and man from all blame in the using all possible meanes, atleast lawfull meanes to reassume that power and trust into his own hands, which being but lent out hath bin so mis-imployed against him. For certainly if I convey my estate in trust to any friend, to the use and behoofe of me and mine, and the person so trusted falsifie the faith so reposed in him, by converting the profits and benefit of my estate to sinister ends, to the prejudice of me and mine, no man will thinke it unlawfull for me, if it be possible, to annihilate such deed of trust.

Now if the King have fundamentally in himselfe the power of denying such things as shall be propounded by them to him it followeth that their Votes without his Majesties assent to them are not binding nor exact obedience unto them: and so all these high Votes of the Houses fall to the ground as invalid.

Lastly, adde therunto that the King must needes be reputed part of the Parliament, which by supposition was in the beginning waved, but a thing alwayes to be acknowledged for truth; then if the Parliament without the king make the representative body, the King is the reall head to that body of the Kingdom; and it were as absurd as monstrous to exclude the head from acting anything that should generally concerne the body, since from the head the spirits are derived, which give both sence and motion to the whole body; and that body which will separate it selfe from the head may please it selfe with the fancy of independency; but the conclusion will leave it a deadly uselesse, and neglected trunke.

And this in briefe have I shewed you that these Votes and Orders which thunder out so much power and terror cannot; properly according to the fundamentall constitution of Parliament be said to be acted, voted, or ordered by Parliament; that name being due unto them, neither a major, nor a meliore parte: And therefore that by the fundamentall Law of this Kingdome I conceive my selfe dis-obliged from any obedience or submission to them.

Thus to prove that by humane Law I am not tyed to obey; now that by conscience I am tied not to obey these Votes and Orders of the pretended Parliament, which are to the opposition of disobedience of His Majesty Kings we know are Gods annointed, & therefore sacred and not to be touched with rude hands; though their demeanour in government be never so wicked, never so unjust, yet the divine character of authority enstamped upon them giveth the man inviolable immunity from humane hands. Hence it was that David though himselfe anointed also by Gods appointment in the roome of Saul durst not injure Saul but his heart smote him for the renting but the lap of Sauls garment, when God had delivered Saul into Davids hands. And shall we applaud our selves without remorse of conscience, when we lay violent hands upon the fairest jewell of the Crowne of our Lords annointed, when we plucke the fairest flower of his garland from his head? Was Saul more sacred, more holy, more virtuous, then our Charles? Or have we more liberty, more priviledge, to disobey, to disrobe Kings of their honour then the Jewes had? Or hath this Parliament a more wise and understanding heart, a more sincere zeale to reformation, a more sacred and divine calling then David had 'Lo thinke wise wee sonnes of men, be learned yee this take upon you to judge the Earth, lest the King of Kings laugh at your folly, and [unreadable word] you in pieces with a rod of iron' O let it be a badge of Antichristianity, of that man of sinne; and odious let it be to all true zelots to exalt themselves against all that is called God. Let us feare to separate that which God hath conjoyned. Hath not he taught both in the Old and New Testament to Feare God and honour the King and shall we now imagine that the dishonouring the King must be the chiefe evidence of our feering of God? God forbid. Let us know 'Rebellion is as the sinne of witchcraft', most odious to God most bewitching and enticing in it selfe. Shall we wonder it should appeare maskt with religion, and usherd in with pretence of reformation? Behold the father of it the Devill, when he would have tempted our Saviour to rebellion against his father. God the father came with scriptumese for a preface; though he knew his mischievous designe of heart could not lye hid from the all-seing eyes of our Lord. How did Absolom court the hearts of the Israelites. when he was in hatching his odious rebellion against his father? was it not with pretence of reformation, saying, 'Behold thy matter is good and just, but there is none deputed of the King to heare it. Oh that I were made Governour over this Land, how would I doe justice to all that came unto me.' And shall this policy of dazeling our purblind mortall eyes seeme now strange unto us? Nay certainly, were not the face of all these present distempeers maskt with a pretence of Reformation, and vizarded with a seeming hatred of Superstition, though ayming at more horrid intentions, how could we so soon have lost and torne the unity of the faith; from the bond of peace? Do we not all beleeve in one God, worship one Trinity, rely upon one Mediator, acknowledge one way to Heaven? And shall the garbe and apparell wherein we make this voyage, the festure whereby we worship this God, the dialect wherein we pray to this Mediatour, set us at a greater distance of affections, then if we were Pagans, Turkes, and Infidels? Doth God more delight in contentions about Ceremonies, Gestures, Words, then in the peace of his Curch? or shall the wearing of a surplice, signeing with a Crosse, bowing of a knee, be able to divorce Christ from his Spouse? Godforbid. 'Oh then I charge you yee Daughters of Jerusalem, and you that wish well unto Sion, by the Roes and by the Hindes of the forrest, that yee awake not this his Sponse, this his Beloved, untill soe please. Oh let us not like the Dog in Esopes fables, quarrell for the shadow, and lose the bone where the marrow is. While we seeke to purifie the Ceremony, let not the substance perish. While we would settle the Church, let us not cut the throat of the State, which is the guard of the Church. Who will powre a vessell of pure wine on the floore, because the ouside of the caske is not eye-pleasing? Or cast away a boxe of rich jewels, because the Cabinet wherein they are, suites not his fancie, 'Oh then let us binde up the breaches of Sion, lest the cloud depart from betweene the Cherubims, and the 'Arke fall into the hands of the uncircumcised.' Let the Magistrate settle the garve of Religion, even Kings, for they are 'Custodes utrius quetafula', and let it be Religion to obey those Magistrates: God hath not given them the sword in vaine, and let not us feele the power there of by suffering due punishment for our disobedience. Thus shall we make Christ our example, who yeelded himselfe under Pilate, when he could have called for legions of Angles to have refused him, but he acknowledgeth even that power of Pilate so unjustly used to be given him from above, and submitted unto it. Thus shall we follow Christs precept to Peter, when he resisted authority, 'Put up thy sword, for they that strike with the sword shall perish by the sword.' Thus shall we tread the steps of our Forefathers, the Apostles, and Fathers in the Primitive Church, who chose rather to glorifie their faith by suffering under, then resisting against the power of Magistracy, though tyrannicall. And if an Angell from heaven (as you thinke) teach you any doctrine contrary to this of Christs, and his Apostles, let him be an Anathema and accursed. It is not the height of your zeale, of not guided with knowledge, can excuse us, for then the Jewes might have had a faire plea for their crucifying of Christ; the Apostle testifying they did it through ignorance: And yet we see what a curse hath dog'd them and their posterity to this day.

Now it thus appearing that Christianity admits not a resisting, defensive force in subjects against their Soveraigne, though never so much abusing their power, that the policie of our State, and the fundamentall constitution of our Kingdome admits not the stile of Parliament in truth to be given to the founder of these Votes and Orders, under colour whereof men presume to take Armes against their Soveraigne, and his commands.

And it being a thing knowne to all the world, that his Majesty hath given abundant satisfaction for the past unhappy accidents in his goverment; had to solemnly protested for the future to be guided by the known Lawes of the Land, and to defend the truth of Religion, the Liberty of the Subject, and the Priviledges of Parliament. What shall any man plead for himselfe at the high tribunall of the Almighty, that shall dare to take weapon in hand against his annointed? let him flatter himselfe how he please with his zeale, doate as he will upon his imaginary fancie of a Parliamente, thinke his infidelity in and to his Prince an argument of his faith to God; yet miserable will his end be who shall perish in such an attempt, and into the congregation of them let not my foule come.

But that I may the more freely commit you to the peace of God, let me either have the hap to satisfie you, or the liberty to expresse that which satisfieth me, that these grand pretenders to the good of the Kingdome, are not such as seeke the peace of either State or church and consequently have no share in the peace of God, and therfore those that will share therein, must not have their portion with them, O how easie had it bin for them, had they sought the peace of this State, to have condiscended to his Majesties gracious proposition of a Parliamentary judicature in other severall places whereto he was concented to refer himself. Thus had the honor of a Parliament bin preserved; thus might the peace of the Kingdom have bin continued, thus the distractions of the religion setled. But what was the reason, what could be the allegation why his Majesty might not have had satisaction herein? nothing that I have either heard or can imagine, but that they could not without hazzard to their persons remove any whither else as they supposed. Well admit it; which yet I thinke (had they no guilty consciences to affright themselves withall) there was no just cause to feare; these persons we see who for their own security would not embrace a hopefull proposition of peace, with hazzard their own persons freely in a civill warre; if their lives were all the hazard, or by their deaths the Kingdom were endangered, is not the same on all sides as much hazzarded and with more probability to be irrecoverable by the imployment of a civill Warre, then by an indifferent condiscention of another place to have met the King in a parliamentary way. O then let the mist be taken from our eyes, and let us discerne, whether these be peace makers or no. or whether they tread the steps of peace, take heed lest though their words be smooth as oyle, yet their, throat prove not an open sepulchre: and if they perish in their own obstinacie, yet let us not be involved in the same sinne, Let us seeke peace and ensure it, and so the God of peace will be with us which shall ever be the prayer of us:

Your loving friend.

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AN ANSWER Or Necessary Animadversions, upon Some late Impostumate

OBSERVATIONS Invective against his Sacred

MAJESTY, Bearing the face of the Publick, But boldly Pen'd and Publish't by a Privado.

That the Hypocrite reigne not, lest the People be ensnard.

CR

LONDON, Printed for Ti Paibody, and are to be sold in Queens-head-Alley in Pater noster-row, 1642

The Epistle to the Reader.

This Rushes not in to make up the Number of pamphlets, but presses out of the throng to Reprove them and to reprove most of all a Countenanc't Pamphlet, that has come like a false Prophet, to cast salt into the troubled waters, so prodigiously to sweeten them, as to imbitter the Fountain. His Boldnese has outfac't his Wit, to fit to determine against a Publick Order, that no businesse of that kind should be transacted by a Privado. Yet he has troubled the Kingdom with his Extra Abilities, to beget a strange Harmony there, out of his own Sphere, as though he should have the luck to Regulate all by his Irregularity: and since he will be a Goliah, a King is not to meet him, but a Stripling, & to fling a stone into his impudent forehead, that now a second time has reproach'd, has chaleng'd al Authority, at any weapo, all Prosperity to the 3. Estates. All just shame to him that has set himselfe to Divide, to Compare so odiously the People and the King, as in his latter Book (evill meaning breaks forth at lest) to make the dignity of the People, in that of the Soveraigne more materiall, more finall.

Reade, Examine,

Farewell.

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An Answer to the Observations.

That the Hypocrite reigne not, lest the people be ensnared.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the insinuation of the Scots example, the terme Malignant, his proper explaining of it, and the authentique nature of the Plots and his Hypotheticall proving of them by a charge upon the King and Queen.

The case is not as Scotland's in all points, &c.

This Gentleman fore intends to declare upon Scotland's case (which may match his purpose) in all points, to parallel it with ours, or aggravate ours with it; our malignant Party (saith he) is far greater: Let a wise man weigh his cunning inference from following, your brotherly Advice by Letter. He looks off from Reading to your Actions, Regards not your Peaceable Lines, but to delineat your former Hostilities, and by the mystery of his zeale and faire dealing pitch his Meditations that way, to pitch a Campe again.

For our Malignant Party is, &c.

This scolding terme, Malignant, pleases him well, and if he call first, his mouth is not hot with the spice of it.

And our holding Hull is not like their holding Newcastle &c.

An Act of Obliviion is most solemnly past upon the Scots business in Newcastle, and by the vertue of that Act, they are cleerely evinct enemies to the publique peace that rip up the fore. This Observation writer, has cloath'd himself undeniably with Malignancy as with a garment, to make that buried Act arguable a fresh. Out of his own mouth his shame, his Oration wrang in that Inke, as in Gall betrayes him, and we are not far to seeke by his own discovery for the malignant party.

We will not refuse the counsell of the Scots Lords, in yeelding to a Pacification, nor depart from their example in securing the same.

He looks upon the Advice of the Councel, but his eyes are rather cast upon the example, he speakes of Peace, but makes ready for war; in securing the same. Not depart from their Example---- this is intricate enough (and what is secret and formidable is malignant enough) whether he intend the example of the whole Scot's businesse, or a part on it. The whole Scot's businesse in covenanting, in bringing in their Plate and moneys (and borrowing other mens Plate) to contribute, to advance a war, and march with such a Militia over another Kingdome's field, to approach the King and demand his bad Counsell, --- or but a part on it, as the deteining the King's strong holds, and designing Officers of his Privy Counsell. Men whom they may confide in, your own party, not Malignant, 'twere breach of Charity to think it, they being men famously just in the new Opinion, it must not be too curiously lookt for in their lives. --- In this clause then, yet still we will not refuse the Counsell of the Scots Lords; some butter in his mouth, nor depart from the example of them, is not the poyson of Aspes under his lips? At the best construction from the example of them but in part, having men of their own in his Forts; of your own in his Privy Councell to confide in. Yet if the Observer will credit his Majestys Letter to the Scots Councell, had he lived amongst them (they protest) they would not have desired so much, --here he must shamefully depart if he will take the Scots own word for it. They will not be his Example----

We have little cause to think that the same malignant. Party, which hath shed so much Protestant bloud in Ireland, &c.

Here is an unjust Judge sate upon the Bench, the Accusers testimony would cleere us of Malignancy, the Protestant Professors in England cannot possibly be so identical of the same Malignant Party that's in Ireland. Seeing no innocent bloud has been shed there but by the Papall party. None shed by Cavaliers, but Cavaliers Catholliques. Yet though his expression cleare us, his intention is unhappy, for by his convertible conceit at the latter end of Papists and Hierarchists, Hierarchists and Papists, he would juggle all into the very same Malignant party of the Papists, that hold with the government of our Church. If this Observer then had been a son of peace, he might have reflected upon dutifull and communion love: Let there be no strife betwixt thee and me, Protestant and Protestant, for we are brethren (though differing in opinion) Benignant. Weake and strong (the Apostle supposes) without taxation of Malignancy.

And for the Plots themselves diverse of them have not been invisible, and yet if the King had not concealed, and did not yet conceale (some passages as being below him) they had been more visible.

- Diverse of them. Some of them, happly the Observer hath observed invisible, and he is not pleased to give diverse Instances, but mysteriously wraps them up in the kings personall concealement. Alas that it needs no wringing from this man, that our gracious king (confest to be so by the mouth of his Parliament) should now be publikely indited, a Part of the Malignant Party: - and did not yet conceale: persisting in evill, is to be habituall, and thus the Kings Majesties inditement is drawn up. Good God defender and avenger of thine Anointed, how many, what habitual protestations hath the King made before thee before the Nations to the contrary, that for the confirming the Protestant Religion, the Peace, the Liberty of the Subject, he hath concealed nothing, nothing publick concealed, hath somewhat that is private, and what can this be discerned to be but Master Germyns black Sattin suite and Bootes, the Observer intimates, some passages they are as being below him, sure then we have hit upon it, which have opened the concealed Passage, The suite and bootes for they are indeed below him --- but if not this sense, then is there an apparent scoffe in this parenthesis (as being below him) put upon his Majestie, as if he the sole intrusted watchman over Englands Israil, should make no conscience to conceale plots against the weale thereof.

Some of our Treasons here have not been planted in traines and mines so deep and dark, &c.

Yet so deep and dark, as the Earle of Rivers hollow Tree, the Earle of Worcester vauted Stable, Sir Kellem Digbies Fats of Caleivers, when they were Les Livres, Books. So dark and deepe as he that tooke up his lodging in the Pit, and overheard two men, wondering their friend came not, who should tell them what Nobility (none of the House of Commons) to be slaine. The single and individuall Skipper, that like Jonah, cast upon our shore, to him alone it was revealed, the intended overthrow of the Land, and that he only could discern whither the Danish fleet was for salt or battery, or the Treasons planted in Traines and Mines, by the Indefinite letters from Amsterdam, that bring this News in that place Ordinance are cast.

And if the King be not privy to the Plots, yet as long as the Plottors having aimes beyond him, plough with his Heifer, &c.

Surely this Logicall man is subtlely verst in Hypotheticals, his words preceeding---- And if the King had not concealed and did not yet conceale. A plaine presumption, though it have if and & int---- but in this clause he will take of the austerity of his other argument (and if the King be not privy) he is in a mind to cleere him with another Busset, strokes the Princely check he last struck, and bids him turne the other, give (the weaker vessell) his heifer a blow to the purpose---- She does nourish the Plotters without an if, as though the Queenes heart could not give his Majesty that liberty of conscience, which she earnestly requests for her selfe----or if the Plotters have but a particular aime, to murder some Persons, her Majesty hath not been known to be of a mere tender and conscionable a Disposition, then to stake up a match for bloud-----plough) with his heifer her Majesties good name hath been plowd upon and that with long furrows: her most deare and intimate Honor harrowed with sharp teeth, witnesse not the three Kingdomes but Europe. Yet such is the vertue of these mens particular Religion, that whose tongues are sharp swords Yet are not they malignant. their tongues are their own and they can vehemently put this terme upon others.

And All by this Power. Our condition is the more desperate and Remedilesse,-----

That her Majesty will advance the mischiefe they cannot be deceived, the Parliament protested against such Articleing. Yet this son (of Shimei it may be feared) hath this cutting reproach in readinesse,----- All the adjects thus tease and cease not, and so amate the Heifer, that is to be sorrowfully feared, she will cast her young, thus more properly is the condition of the Royall Throne remedilesse.

And if the King cannot see into the breasts of those his followers, whom we suspect, he ought not so far to despise the publick jealousies.

In these Lines he fits us with most proper convertible propositions,--- If the subjects cannot see into the Kings breast, they ought not so far to despise his Majesties publick, so often publick protestations, and this other parallel conclusion, seeing they the only loving and true Protestant subjects (as they protesse themselves) cannot see into the affection of the Kings feare, that they would not despise his in severity from such considerable multitude, as he mentions at Whitehall and Westminster, and truly adjudge them (though there might be some honest and well meaning men) multitudes considerable, inconsiderate too much-- the Observer----- he ought not so far to despise. Notwithstanding this private mans Wat. Tyler -like insolency, so contemptuously to charge contempt of his People upon his majesty. Yet the Parliaments first Remonstrance, in the acknowledging his manifold Acts of grace, will vindicate, will brand this sufficiently, and his Majesties often charges to his Ministers of Justice: his strict Proclamations for disarming all Papists, will evince that he hath keept true Protestant sentinell, and not snorted over the insecurity of his people.

CHAP II.

Concerning his positive charge against his Majesty in his Derogation from Parliaments, and inducing the Privy Counsell to concurre to it.

The King freqently vowes to maintain Parliaments in their Priviledges, yet his Papers many ways derogate from them.

His Majesties Declaration in answer to the 21 of June.

This man might be the two Houses, he is so familiar with the King: his Majesty chides them the Representative body of a Land, that they will take no notice from whence his Letter came and vouchiase it no other mention but of A Paper (as if found by chance) to our trusty and well-beloved, &c. What is the proportionable chastisements of a foot-member, to fall upon the Lords Annoynted, as a stone of a stumbling with his tongue? He enervates all his Majesties vowes to maintaine Parliaments, and deales not now hypothetically with him, but drawes up a full & positive charge against the King, ----His Papers many wayes derogate--- He Articles thus,

First, if he please to sever himselfe, those great Councels are not to be named parliaments.

And forely this is no Derogation, which is the Propriety of his Majesty, and which is the confession of the two Houses; That by the fundamentall Laws of the Land, tis the Kings meere grace to call them, and where there is no debt there is no injury, to dissolve, to separate, and without his Counsell, those great Councels cannot be named Parliaments absolute: Parliament being most essentially the Kings Parle, with his Great Councell: and incase of nonage, tis but a parliament under correction, which as necessity made them call it, so Necessity afterwards to call upon his Majesty to ratifie it: The Protector in his steed and and themselves are to be Responsable for all, and the Specification is, Le Roy vault.

secondly whatsoever Name is due, the vertue of publique Representation is denyed them &c, and this is Destructive to the Nature of Parliaments.

Here the observers understanding is thickned, his Majesty by vertue of his warrant calls them, and when they are a publique Body representative called, there is no secret influence issues out of the Body so called, as that one proper Result; that before they were called they were absolutely beholden to the vertue of the Kings will, but being called they are not so absolutely beholden. But a mysterious power buds and springs out of themselves to exist and subsist on a necessary Result hence, that when the King hath called and made them a body Representative, with few words speaking he may make them come without the destroying the Nature of Parliament; as the Acts past this Parliament by the King and his great Counsell are Acts truly flowing from the essence of Parliaments as ever any, notwithstanding the King dissolved the Body Representative this time two yeare. And to further cleere it; if his Majesty had legall power to dissolve, after it had sate many weeks, he might as justly disolved it the very first day.

Thirdly if the concurrence of both Houses Nullo contradicente bee of some sanctity and Authority; yet the major prat of both Houses is not so vigorous as the totall, and here is another device to frustrate parliaments..

This Gentleman now hee is got in pleases himself with arguing, though he but Minister matter to be resell'd, hee would have it observ'd how neatly hee places the weakest Arguments in the middest, he presents two propositions both which may be granted, both which may be observed to be nothing to the purpose, to this purpose of his, to frustrate all Parliaments. It is admitted the concurrence of both Houses, Nullo contradicente--- of some sanctity the next also, the Major part not so vigorous as the Totall. Now let but Youth weigh it, these Propostions founded, a device lies hid in it to frustrate all Parliaments, an inference worthy of a Naturall Logician. Sure there is an escape of will here, or the edge cutting Diamond is blunted, but to lend the Observer soome Conclusions, and to leaave nothing confused to the Reader, the concurrence of both Houses Nullo contradicente, of some Sanctity, and here is some sanctity in the man, that hee jussels not in with some other Quintessence beside the Doctrine of Necessity, that if the Militia be voted and none Contradict (the King only contradicting) t'is without him providentially Authentick. This man should also lesse affirme, the new Militia even upon pretext of Necessity: when the Majority must be pol'd, and the Scales of the votes dancing indistinguishable whither they leane, when the Militia seemes utterly to leane from its Old Master, is not this a device by peremptory voting to frustrate Parliaments, Parliaments in gravest Acts as the Militia? A totall concurrence seldome but runs to a cleere) to a fit truth. A Majority by one or two, to a suspected; so is not so vigorous to declare this, for a Truth gives meane Activity to frustrate, but right to direct Parliaments.

Fourthly if the Majority shall binde, and the Minority acquiesce therein, yet, if it be objected that some few factious spirits mislead, and befoole the majority: all is voide, Parliaments made Ridiculous Assemblies, all justice from the Kings sole breast &c.

Plentifull Conclusions to erect folly and Rebellion, to proclaime weakenesse and boldnesse to the full ----Ad Partes---- yet if it be objected---- happily he deemes such an Objection not Rationall, yet Scripture is for it, one man drew away 400.l. as Theudas, one man much people as Indus of Galilee? Ecclesiasticall Stonry for it, one man armes a thousand Million: and in this deep knowing Age, one worldy wise and Philosophically subtle may seduce 300. especially under the pretence of Ardent Religion. Probable enough from hence that a few factious Spirits may mislead, now to the plentifull Result; All is voide, Magicall Spirits surely, if not any Right and just Acts can passe for them---- hee hath got the sent and followes it hot. Parliaments made Ridiculous Assemblies, what? upon some Abuses by Factious spirits a Particularibus Universale the hand stretcht largely forth to ca'ch a flye, and it's gone---- he might tolerably have concluded this, that this or that Parliament upon which the factious Spirits had influence, might become a Ridiculous Assembly ---- but hee hath all Revelation, and to his thinking goes cleere away with it---- All justice at the last resort is to be expected from the Kings sole breast. If this Argument have dint in it, here is a Ponyard indeed set to the breast of the King. A free People cannot but hate a King that locks up that justice, when they can read it in no Paper, and which is more poisonfull have had a Magna Charta and now is all obliterate. In these degenerate Times surely the Commons will with the Observer take it for grant that it is so. Great inchantment here about the King, his Proclamations Paper indeed, and God save the King an abuse of God's Name. Let his Majesty live, and this insinuated Argument be trod under foot thus---- Some factions mislead the Majority, the King affirmes this to his People, it will follow upon it (all justice from his sole Breast.) O prodigie of reasoning the Denyall of an Act, and give a probable Reason for it, conclude the Law totally gone; so it runs all justice from his breast. A gracious King made in despight of his soule a Tyrant.

For if the King will withdraw himselfe, all Courts as well as Parliaments are thus defeated.

This virulent ulcerating Accusation in nine more following Lines - traiterously exagitate and tossse the Royall Scepter out of his hand: examine this if he Peremptorily deny one or two Acts he razes the foundation of Parliament, and then breaks up the Benches of all his Courts. Here is a double seducement of the Innocent Subject, the first already demonstrated---- one or two Acts all Parliaments that which followes all Courts---- and yet he jeers that, if we will dissolve Parliaments into nothing, we ought to erect some other Court above them- How does this consist all Courts as well as Parliaments, and yet some other Court to bee erected above them. Thus he confounds himselfe, and layes an heavy burden upon the simple, that for their want of discerning Capacity must absolutely confide in any Apologizer for Parliaments. This Argument of his is further to be taken in pieces, Courts of justice and not Parliaments are not coeffentiated, two Natures inseparable, two simples incorporate, feeling they are really distinct. To the Courts belong matter of Law establisht, to the Parliament matter of abuse of those Lawes. And tis not proper for Parliament to have the direct hearing of the first proceedings of a Litigious cause, but to heare afterward of the indirect proceedings of a cause: and though abuses may be in other Courts: and are Reformable in Parliaments, yet are Abuses also in Parliaments supposeable, of this Rock would be dangerous, they cannot erre. There is also this other Distinction to the passing of a publique Act in Parliament. There is essentially requisite the particular Act of the Kings hand, not so to other Courts. Hee is the chief judge of the one personally, intirely, not so in the other, when in matters of learned Difficulty of the Law, it is essentially proper to the Professors of it. Lastly this Distinction from Experience that the Courts of justice have beene open, and no doubt justice perform'd unto thousands, Parliaments not existing. But seeing Parliaments are Consuetudines Popists Anglia are English men primely Inheritances and the sole happy meanes of mutuall inducement of King and People. Let not them prosper that are secretly reserv'd against them, or that does not blesse God and honor the King without grudging jealousie for the Bill of Trienniall Parliaments, But what if the Major and better part of the Privie Counsell concurre with the King, if Parliaments must downe?

Surely if this observer were Burgesse his Vote should politickly passe against the existence of Privie Councell, during the session of Parliament. But if such a Vote shall not succeed hee will render them odious thus. No this easier baite only, to make the Major Vote of Privie Councell as requisite to both Houses, as the Major Vote of Privie Councell to concurre with the King that Parliaments must downe, a supposition how ever detestable, the observer knowes he can no sooner utter but the vulgar believe the sound thereof. Italian and Jewish, a double malignancie of poyson in this. First to intoxicate and ingage the King in his height of Tyrannie, not onely to impose illegalities upon the people, but to make them ever remedilesse and desperate. Finally, divest them of the innermost garment of English Law, put down, annihilate Parliaments. Corrupt but the major part of his Privie Councell by his grace, and insnare them by his wit to expedite this grand privation.A supposition of this Gentleman as allowable, as to bee within the reach of a Lion, and exasperate his courage. The other draught of malignancie is this (and one of the poysons he would have worke( that the King is at inveterate odds with Parlaments, and to blast the glory of them under colour of favour (which is of mischiefes the dregs and depth) he should cause the great Councell exist, and face to face advance his Privie Counscell above them. Good God, these are thine Annointeds afflicting aflictions, coucht scandals, Corrosives of Misery and Treasons (to use his owne words) planted in Traines, and mines so deepe and darke hath his Majestie ascrib'd no other honour to his present Parliament, but this against all Parliaments? and by Privie Councell way, the path whereof he needs not, when his owne heart might execute it more uncontrouleably, lesse dangerously than to make it lesse private to have Privie Councell know of it: Is it not in the Kings power alone to put downe Parliaments for his time, but the major part of Privie Councell must be indu'ct and tradu'ct to concurre to it---after this dismall charge. Let the kings meaning be cleare to his people in these his owne words, and whose advice we are resolved to follow. Is it fit his Majestie should have a Privie Councell, and not more fit in times of gravest Judicature than any other? When his Primary ultimate Vote is to forme or to deforme a Law? that man that hath the Votes of other intrusted to him, ought in Conscience more to deliberate in passing two Votes than a single. His sacred Majestie that intrusted hath deposited the Votes Anihilate of all his people, and with the silent (if it may bee so said ) Votes of the Lawes themselves, that are in being ought to double and treble his deliberation by Privie Councell, and when he hath heard his learned Councell in secresie, he is not bound to the jamor Vote, but to guide himselfe by as much of their light, as he disceernes to burne clearely; and where it is said he is resolved to follow their advice, that denotes the intention of his spirit, to give place to wholsome counsell that hee will not bee froward or prejudiciory to them, when they have convinc'd his Majesty of Law or convenience.

The Kings words, that he observes upon, are these, that those Rebels publikely threaten the rooteing out of the name of the English.

His quicke insight cannot let this passage passe for current. Your gravity of his observation is this, it is probable he sayes, but there is some other immutation now hapned, and what this Immutation is this supposer would have men believe, though hee declares not, and thus he invites men to imagine what he dares not declare, and yet he declares, what no other hath dard. He bites at every vindication of his Majestie, and even in the Kings appeale to God, he pursues him with Levitie.

CHAP. III.

His way of entering upon the Argument of the Militia. His ventilation or fanning (but wth poore puffes of winde) the Kings Argument. His glorying in the present Posture. His magnifying Parliaments with forgetting the King is a part on't.

The question is not to bee put indefinitely whether or no the King ought to order the  Militia in times of no extra-ordinary danger; our case is not upon supposition, if the King in extraordinary danger will not yeeld to such a posture, Sir, The question is whether the Parliament,&c. Indefinately he puts not the quesstion, definitely hee thus places it. The King ought to order the Militia in times of no extra-ordinarie danger. Whether this bee sence or  scorne, it is hard to judge. In times of no extraordinary danger, the Militia to bee put in posture, no sense. The King then may doe it, a scorne----our case is upon supposition. A case gone at common, Law and treads upon common sense, unlesse he will grant this supposition: For a King by a meere neglecting his Kingdom in danger extraordinary, were to advance to the Crowne of a more stately Kingdome; a supposition as probable, as for an hungry man to feed upon this sentence be then fed. He must not have the reason that he is a King, who in extraordinary danger will not militiat his kingdome. And hee is unworthy naturall right that is unnaturall, And the onely Shepheard, when the Wolfe comes exposes the sheepe.

If the Parliament invade his power over the Militia causlesly, whether they may not as well seize any subjects estate.

This a cleare and mutuall consequence, the free estate of a subject is in no wayes but in case of Nonage, or non compos ment is to bee administred by another, if hee be in an habituall way of drinking and gameing. Yet no sequstration of his estate. More tendernesse of a free Prince, his Magazins and Townes, that hath not only propriety but Majesty imprinted, every action against (without parasitisme) is capable of just aggravation, and the Law is more vindicative. Hath he confest right (so by the observor) in the Militia by what meanes is it transferrable? by necessitie which knowes not the voyce of Law? then must that necessity bee at the dore, not supposeable abroad, and this hath ever beene cleere in any subjects eye before the Common-weale sets foot upon his propriety: and they are to pay for his dammage, nothing publike, being imposeable upon a particular mans charge, or he loses his inheritance (though hee loses not his Land) in the liberty of the subject: this necessity upon a particular mans interest hath beene knowne, but when upon the Kings, who (as it is below him to receive recompence, so to have any power of his to bee invaded. And it is yet unheard of in the straites of nature such a necessity, that a King should bee tempted against himselfe in a civill strife and not diabolicall, this tends to the generation of a new thing under the sunne, to keepe the Kings Magazin for him, and himselfe justly from it in a sane mans opinion there must be madnesse on one side, and the King is illegally dealt with, unlesse hee bee so unhappily termd to bee above the Law, to have no Law to right him, and that such a necessity shall be contingent to him, as there shall be no particular knowledge of the end thereof. But others must arbitrate the being and end of his necessity and hee know neither.

That question then which must decide all is this, whether that posture which the Parliament chooses, or that of the KINGS bee most safe at this time.

This man is exceeding punctuall when hee shoots at one Butt instead of another, and answer Question with Question, and his Learning is subtle when his confidence is thus materiall. This decides all. The Kings propriety  is invaded, and hee would satisfie Rationall men with this. Another uses it better. But to descend to his Materialities, whether Posture bee most safe. Surely Posture which unites King and People is most safe, that which disjoynts it in every Member is not a friend to safety, not a friend to Protestants, but to Protestants for Advantage, A divided Kingdome is not a Posture against Plots in every County and Corner, the Roote of Division being the hell of all Plots, and this is the Roote of Division, when in case of breach betwixt Master and Servant, the Master must first accommodate, and sure that is odde accommodation of a servant, when he demands more, rather than Recede, and the Question now may very well be put indefinitely, who are the greatest Abettors with Irelands Commotions, men that would be rul'd by Law, or enjoy their owne Pretences now in the totall judge, whether to maintaine controversies against the Soveraigne Head, bee Bulwarkes of a Kingdome and subjects that seeke no subjective accomodation bee not to bee imagined more politicke then honest, and whether this observer hath decided any thing who hath promoted the concision?

No King was ever yet so just but that Parliaments in some things have reduced from error.

Whatsoever he meanes he drawes this up somewhat neately to open him a little from personall errors 'tis in the greatest Court correctively to reduce, suadere possunt, corrigere non possunt unlesse his Majesty could put on the person of a private man (as it hath been learnedly distinguished from his Regall Authroity) and catch him in that person, and so take an order with him. Now for generall errors, and acts of injustice they have been ingeniously laid upon his Ministers, and seeing all men may erre. Packe up in Bodyes as well as private 'tis more safe to have one above the Law that cannot be reduc'd then many.

Now every man may arraigne Parliaments.

And what is hee a son of man, that hath reproachfully arraigned the Lords Annoynted? would not his high transgression be found out but that Instum est be quod injustum est alibi ? and that he hath rather got the time then equity so speake; can this man evade by a mathematicall point, to arraigne his Majesty and not the Parliament? he lifts up his head with new Ideas, & no modesty can be in his face, while they are in his fancy, he is the very man that hath arraign'd Parliaments.

No King so unjust that Parliamens did seduce.

Men that usurpt the name of Parliament have, as the observer himselfe intimates concerning Richard the second, the trust they assum'd enabled them to seduce, when powerfull will had more influence then Law or nature upon the Parliament and that of Henry 3 concerning the twelve Regent Peers, is too remarkable.

Ever since wee must dispute for Parliaments, first wee say they must in probabilitie bee more knowing then any other Privado.

He says well in probabilitie they may, in it they are not, for hee a notorious Privado has declared, and continues to declare what they undertake not, and has paraphrais'd upon his Majesty with that boldnesse which the representative body assumed not in his second & third reason hee conflicts the matter with private men and hits first one of his cheeks, then another, thus he fells his credit, cheaper then his Papers.

CHAP 4.

Concerning his owne Arguments which direcly make for aristocraticall Userpuation.

And if five hundred of the Nobilitie and Gentrie should aime at an Aristocraticall usurpation &c.

What the definitive number of 500 aime at, tis not to be enquired, what this mans reasoning aimes at is not unseene, in his subsequent pages, upon this the Subject Militia, he declares the end of all authority in Substitutes is that the Kigdome may be duly and safely  served, not that the Kings meere fancy may be satisfied and that end is more likely to be accomplished where the Kingdome than where the King chooses &c. The confidence of the people in times of distraction more requisite then the Kings, &c. for example sayes hee-- the King had a prerogative to dissolve Parliaments at pleasure, and the abuse of the Prerogative was the cause of all our late sufferings, but this Prerogative restrained what injurie is it &c.

To Remonstrate these principles, and sure many of his Abettors (though thy be not of the 500) have the same same: the end of all Authority &c. not that the Kings meere fancy may be satisfied, hee loves a Monarch he tells you but he conceipts he may have more fancy than wisedome. Let the two Houses of Parliament argue it out with this man that the K. may be clear when they judge-----the Kingdom has not been duly and safely serv[d by Substitutes---the judicious Houses Reverberate. That the King was not to be taxt in these undue clouds of government. Hee as clear as the Sun (so Mr, Pym) they charge him not with meere fancy but salva Majistrate with due reverencs to Monarchie, they indite the proper persons the Substitutes for their wisedome could not thinke that if they had substitutes of their owne whom they must confide in, Those not of the Malignant Partie that might betray the Truth, as example is not wanting, therfore they would not thinke to be fairly dealt with to bee accused of fancies--- has he not prov'd himself a fancie superinendent to that great Counsell, to keep no bounds while they warily keepe oft the violation of the Trhone?

2. Argue. And that end is more likely to be accomplished, where the Kingdome than where the King chuseth, does hee understand what a Monarchy is, and Out-lawes him with these Positions; Let him looke upon the face of his Sentence, and see whether Aristocraticall Usurpation is not in the fore-head; and the matter is so plaine 'twere not unskilfull to use his owne Conjuration to bring up his spirit of errour ---------. O that some Mercury would reconcile my undersstanding in this Couirt Logicke, or give mee some clew of thread to disengage me out of this blind Labyrinth; but he slumbers on further and comparatively all, the confidence of the People in Times of distraction, more requisite than the Kings. Sure by  Scripture and Reason, the eyes of Government in eminent perills, are not to be put out of the Head, to discerne more cleare out of the Breasts and Belly ---- unlesse Aristocraticall, where such an imperfect State has no head.

In Monarchie rightly understood degrees of Comparison are not acknowledged betwixt the King and his people --- these conclusions surely innovate that the people should have more vigilancie or confidence in the Kingdomes affaires than the King: for what State businesses soever are fairely carried, what iminent dangers prevented or repaid, redound transeminently and really to the glory of the Crowne, where there is a Monarch ---- more confidence gives the people a Comparatively Superlative degree of the honour of the Kingdomes safety. Hee merits not the name of Pilot where the common Mariners are especially said to have brought the Ship to her Port ----- Hee failes now but in a slender point of absolute Aristocracie. One man to be nam'd highest, and the people to share all vertue and vigilancie of Government, as it is to be instanc't in the Prince of Orange and the states of Holland.

3. Argue. Let his other words concerning Regulating of Government be heard.

The King had a Prerogative to discontinue and to dissolve all Parliaments at pleasure, and the abuse of this Prerogative was the cause of all our late sufferings. Does he meane the abuse of it passing the Bill it should not be dissolved without consent? surely this Prerogative finally past away, his Majesty must supplicate for the rest. For him to have power to call and not dissolve, is the breake-neck or Reason no lesse than Royalty. Quo modo quicquid constituitor dissulvitur. After what manner any thing is established, may be disolved: For the KING properly to call, and the two Houses properly to dissolve. A Constitution Heterogeneous and utterly unworthy of a Prince and State: For his Majesty to grant it in extreme necessity may satisfie the State, but his Crowne is not satisfied till it be recalled; and no doubt this Prerogative is to be as thankfully returned as it was piously lent. Let the Observer note how consistible it is for the King not to give an Act of Grace but his Power. That Crowne is not perfit out of which reall vertue is departed. Thus much concerning Aristocraticall usurpation.

Chap. 5.

Cencerning the validity of his Arguments for the new Militia.

But to come more particulary to the Militia, the Kingdome trusts the King with Armes as it doth with Lawes.

Admit this; No Lawes then to be made. no Armes to be taken up without him. Has he stopt the current of publike justise in Westminster, or courts subordinate? and what jealousie is that, that he will cause the Bullets to be too big for the Muskets when the enemy is at hand, or the enemies preparation heard of? to render to his Majesty no sounder Law than this is, indeed to trust his Majesty with Armes as it does with Lawes, with both equally, with neither.

1. Argue. But in this new Militia the King is not so much excluded from his Generall Superintendence, and supreame influence, as he is in Subordinate Courtes of justice, and yet even in the Kings Bench, where the King in Pleas of the Crowne may not first judge, he may not be said to be excluded.

This Gentleman has now brought that from the Courts of Justice which will cast him selfe. Surely his Majesty would acquiesce in such a parallel superintendency in his Militia, as in his Subordinate Courts, not personallly to order the Militia, not personally to give sentence on the Bench, most vertually in both, by him the Judges to decree justice: by him the Lord Lieutenants to exercise, to execute: these not primarily from him. He is improperly A Defender of his Lawes and people, for though his Grand Counsellours may be most wise and vigilant, hee recedes so far from the nature of a supreme Governour, as his vigilancy is not superintendent to theirs.

2. Argue. First, Because it excludes him from the disposing of it, Secondly, From determining it at his pleasure.

Kings are to be Phylosophers, and the sole Moderators in Kingdomes, and whereas they may have States-men of more subtile heads and can more intelectually Phylosophize than they, yet such States-men are in no wise to arrogate absolute Power to determine, though they may have the absolute faculty; but are to prostrate the gravity of their wisedome to their Soveraigne, that he may either specifie, lest it be enact, or reject it, let it  have no place: and the wisest upon their wisedome not taking due effect, ought rather to reflect upon his power, hee may doe this, than reproach him for his wit that hee has not capacity for the depth of Counsell: and though they be a Body of wise men, they ought not peremptorily to manifest they are wise to the People for this were undeniable, both  indiscreet, and disobedient. Indiscreet to be forwardly wise without the head; disobedient to wave the duty to the Head. Let the King therefore Reign: without halting Regalitie, and be in his owne Dominions predominant; and this glory of his ever shine in all the new Acts his People would have, to dispose, to dedermine them.

3. Argue. But the King is not excluded thereby, for the King hath more cause to confide in men recommended by the highest Court, than the People have in men prefer'd meerely by the King, &c.

An admirable Position, a more admirable Reason. The Position, the King is not excluded the King utterly dissents, and yet he is in the Act. Nolenti non fit injuria: Principles turning up the heeles. This Proposition is so intricately laid that it gives this instruction. The people and true Subjects of the king, cannot but open their eyes upon Majesty, unlesse there be this thickest mist before them: they are not Organically to see a notionall and meerely internall excellency of the King --- as this: the King is not excluded the thing to which he will not consent. This thick mist has no dissipation, no scattering: for the good Commons must never expect it more visibly cleare, 'tis Metaphysicall, in an highest entity, And they must absolutely confide, wher they have no capacity to examine, no sence of their own when 'tis this mans reported sence from the Houses. There followes a more admirable Reason, for the King hath more cause to confide in men recommended by others, than the people in men recommended by him. Here is need of more of this mans Mercury to reconcile the understanding. The King is not excluded in this strange way of inclusion, to be where he will not be in this strange way of infusion, to believe where he must not have liberty to believe; for the King to make it his owne opinion. So the Observer might have inverted it upon him, but with more scorne than reason. That hee ought more to confide in men recommended by the two Houses than by him selfe. This were to beg the King to be popular in his conclusions, and act better the part of a private than a publike person, and to be ever under Tutors, so meeke and humble not to sue out his Nonage. This cannot be the Kings, this cannot be a meane mans (not to meane in capacity) opinion: to be tyed to any mens judgement in things, much lesse in persons, things being more immutable than persons. Sure 'tis most free for any man to trust whom he pleases, and more confide in them then whom any other may make choyce of. Much more odious is the comparison made unto the King which untowardly reflects upon him slefe. The parties whome the two Houses confide in may deceive confidence, so the King supposes whoinsoever he intrusts, and all the people ought to thinke this; and true Subjects to a King will cry downe all competence betwixt him and men subordinate. Thus the Reason it selfe is examin'd, but not yet the dependence which makes it so admirable: The King not excluded the thing 'tis against, for the King hath more caus &c. Hee might here have urged a good reason, and yet irrationall to the purpose. But he has a double ill hap to introduce a reason confounded in it selfe to approve confusion, the King hath more cause. A precept doth not make any man concurrent in a thing but his Art, it is Scripture if he be against it, he is not with it, though there may be reason, for him not to be against it and suppose this if a man reape benefit from a businesse to which he was averse,  common sence tells him, it was no mercy to himselfe, he was excluded the worke, (unlesse it may be granted hee might cooperate aversly) and that same Numericall good to which he had no consent is rather said to bee bestowed on him then his property, and propriety no doubt he hath where he is not excluded, the other part of this dependency, as it is in comparison (as well as precept) then the people have in men preferred onely by the King here it followes, the peoples confiding of more satisfacrorie consequence then the Kings, therefore where they confide most, though the King most oppose it, he is not excluded, Parallel Logick with all he hath had yet. A good Solicitor Generall at arguings that perpetually makes disscisin and dissinherison of the Medius Prunus that should knit the businesse together.

Last updated 13. February, 2015